IC-NI 


UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


THEORIES  OF  THE  OBLIGATION  OF 
CITIZEN  TO  STATE. 


BY 

MELVIN  GILLISON  RIGG,  2nd. 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED    TO    THE     FACULTY    OF    THE     GRADUATE    SCHOOL    I1T 

PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 

THE    DEGREE    OF   DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 


PHILADELPHIA,    PA. 
1921 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
MELVIN  GILLISON  RIQQ,  2ND. 


PRESS  OF 

INTELLIGENCER  PRINTING  Co. 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


The  writer  wishes  to  express  his  appreciation  to  his  teacher, 
Professor  Edgar  A.  Singer,  Jr.,  under  whose  direction  the  pres- 
ent thesis  was  written. 


452281 


THEORIES  OF  THE  OBLIGATION  OF  CITIZEN 

TO  STATE. 

I.  THE  DIALECTIC  OF  POPULAR  PATRIOTISM. 

Of  all  the  virtues  belonging  to  our  ordinary  moral  code,  there 
is  perhaps  no  other  whichJKas  received  the  hearty  popular  sup- 
port  given  to  patriotism.  Yet  it  will  require  only  ajglance  be- 
neath  the  surface  to  convince  one  that  patriotism,  like  many 
accepted  yaj.uations,_inyolves  a  problem.  Upon  closer  exami- 
nation it  would  appear  that  there  is  no  other  virtue  which  re- 
duces to  such  contradictions. 

It  may  easily  be  perceived  that  we  are  completely  biased 
in  our  judgments  by  our  nationalistic  connections.  We  heartily 
approve  of  certain  actions  when  performed  by  one  of  our  country- 
men for  the  sake  of  our  country.  Yet^ the  same  actions  per-^ 
formed  by  a  foreigner irjLJJie.intej£sl^ 

demned.  As  Professor  Royce  says,  "  War-songs  call  the  indi- 
vidual enemy  evil  names  just  because  he  possesses  the  very 
personal  qualities  that,  in  our  own  loyal  fellow-countrymen,  we 
most  admire.  'No  refuge  could  save  the  hireling  and  slave/ 
Our  enemy,  as  you  see,  is  a  slave,  because  he  serves  his  cause 
so  obediently.  Yet  just  such  service  we  call,  in  our  own  coun- 
try's heroes,  the  worthiest  devotion."  (The  Philosophy  of  Loy- 
alty, p.  109)  Occasionally^  it  is  true,  a  more  sportsmanlike 
•attitudfi-bfifiomes apparent,  but  the  extent  of  this  attitude  is 
always  narrowly  limited.  TO  establish  the ;'! act_that  there  is~ja_ 
fundamental  distinction  which  is  all  but  universal,  it  is  neces- 
sary only  to  refer  to  some  concrete  instances.  There  is  no 
heavier  opprobrium  than  that  which  is  attached  to  the  enemy 
spy.  And  yet  Nathan  Hale  is  one  of  our  national  heroes.  JSh, 
Roger  Casement,  when  he  declares  that  in  Ireland  alone  is 
loyalty  to  one's  country  a  crime,  is  either  a  wretched  traitor  or 
an  inspired  patriot:  it  depends  upon  whether  you  look  at  him 
through  English  or  Irish  spectacles. 

Other  contradictions  are  involved  more  intimately  with  the 
relation  of  patriotism  to  the  rest  of  the  moral  code.  By  a  few 
it  is  asserted  that  patriotism  justly  demands  the  support  of  the 
citizen  only  when  his  country  is  in  the  right.  L.  T.  Chamberlain 
takes  such  a  view  in  his  pamphlet,  Patriotism  and  the  Moral 

5 


6  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

Law.  But  it  is  evidepk thatsuch  is  not  the  prevalent  view- 
point. Mr.  Chamberig^uPsTjatriotic  citizen  would  jnot  meet 
with  much  respect  for  his  alleged_patriotism  while  _  opposing,  his 
country's  efforts  in  a  war  which  he  considered  immoral.  .The 
formula  when  clearly  stated  is  that  I  must  support  my  country 
right  or  wrong.  Now .j)his_.is_a  s^erious__difficulty.  It  is  by  no-/ 
means  easy  tojinderstand  Kow__niy__a^liojLjna5L-be  right  while 
supporting  an  activity  which  is  wrong.  There  is  a  philosophy, 
it  is  true,  which  would  solve  jhe  difficulty  by  insisting  that  a 
state's  actions  are  supermoial.  Qfte  may,  perhaps,  ^gLmjtt_tliaJL, 
the  moj*aKty  of  j:^ 

ofL  a  human  individual.  (See  Bosanquet,  The  Philosophical 
Theory  of  the  State,  pp.  322-328;  also  A.  C.  Bradley,  International 
Morality:  The  United  States  of  Europe,  an  essay  contributed  to 
The  International  Crisis.)  _But Jthis  does  jiotjmean  that  the 
state  is  above  moral -criticism  altogether.  And  the  theory  which 
teachesMihis  latter_doctrine  has  received  very  little  popular 
consideration .  We  have  no  hesitancy  whatever  in  ascribing  a 
moraLcharacter  tqjthe  public. _  acts _  of _  our  enemies .  IfJLnter- 
national  pqHti^  sin  is  a  lacl 

of  cleyeriiess,  why  all  -this  popular outcry  against  the  -Kaist 
Forjthe  popular  consciousness,  at  any  rate,  the  actions  oL,a 
state mjiy  feejthe^  The  state's  action 

may  be  wrong,  butjjhe  citizen  must  support  ^notwithstanding. 
But  the  popular  conception  of  patriotism  does  not  stop  here. 
Any  state  may  conceivably  be  wrong  in  the  abstract,  but  as  a 
matter  of  practice  Jt_is_  always  the  enemy  state  and  never  our 
owrx-whifih,is  wrong.  Our  nationalistic  bias  again  makes  itself 

*•  felt     Patriots  are  not  accustomed  to  dwell  upon  the  possibility 
of  their   country's   being  wrong.     The   typical   patriot   would 

%  .hardly  be  described  as  the  man  who  supported  his  country's, 
Actions  though_Jie ^considered  them  immoral;  he  is  rather  the 
man  who  always  believes  that  his  country  is  right. 


popularly  understood,  involves  the^  acceptance  of  our  country's 
judgments  in  matters  of  mpj^ls.  ""In  somewhat  the  style  of 
Professor  Royce,  the  typical  patriot  might  be  described  as  the 
man  who  makejJhisjcountryTa  will,  his  will;  her  Durpose8r  hisr 
purposes;  her  moral  standards,  his  also.  Patriotism  thus 
'  xevolution  in  the  sphere  of  morals.  It  is,  jy 


to  hfl.f.ft(  we  are  told.     3But  in  time  of  war  hatred  becomes  a 

"^^"^w™*^*^*^^™"*ww^1^ 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  7 

virtue.  The  furtherance  of  our  country's  purpose J>ej;omes_our 
conscience,  our  criterion  of  morality,  and  we  judge  right  and 
wrong  accordingly.  Not  that  we  admit  we  {io  this.  Our_ 
intellectual  dishonesty  is  *ggre  perverse  s_till.  We  apparently 
adhere  to  our  old  moral  code^  And  we  always  find  a  way  of 
justifying  our  actions  and  our  country's  actions  upon  the  basis 
of  this  code.  We  are  expert  casujsja,  The  writings  of  certain 
German  professors  during  the  war  show  to  what  an  extent  such 
justification  can  be  carried.  History  must  be  interpreted  so 
that  our  country  will  always  be  presented  in  a  favorable  light. 
We  are  fond  of  accusing  the  Germans  of  this.  Yet  when  The 
National  Security  League  advocates  an  "  improvement  in  school 
text-books  so  as  to  influence  against  texts  which  perpetuate 
errors  with  regard  to  the  wars  and  international  relations  of  the 
United  States,"  we  begin  to  suspect  that  the  people  concerned 
would  be  perfectly  willing,  if  it  were  necessary,  to  sacrifice  the 
interests  of  historical  truthfulness  to  the  purposes  of  patriotic 
education.  (Proceedings  of  the  Congress  of  Constructive  Patriot- 
ism, 1917,  p.  348)  We  seem  to  be  required,  in  the  interests  of 
patriotism  popularly  understood,  to  subordinate  all  our  moral 
valuations,  including  the  virtue  of  truthfulness,  to  the  purposes 
of  our  country.  However,  the  very  fact  that  we  do  not  admit 
of  such  a  criterion  in  the  state,  but  must  seek  to  justify  political 
acts  upon  the  basis  of  the  moral  code,  points  out  most  clearly 
the  fundamental  contradictions  in  the  situation. 

These  are  some  of  the  contradictions  of  popular  patriotism. 
We  have  an  unwarranted  bias  in  favor  of  our  own  countrymen. 
We  insist  that  states  shall  be  subjected  to  the  moral  law,  that  a 
state's  actions  may  be  right  or  wrong.  And  yet  we  require  the 
citizen  to  support  his  state,  right  or  wrong.  Although  we  would 
admit,  in  the  abstractf  that  our  country  might  finn^iyfljjJx_hft 
wrong,  yet  as  a  matter  of  fact  our  country  is  always  miracit 
lously  right.  We  make  our  country's  purpose  the  criterion  of. 
our  morality.  But  instead  of  confessing  that  we  twist  our 
consciences  to  suit  the  purposes  of  the  state,  we  insist  that  these 
purposes  agree  with  our  conscience&o^x-- 

All  these  considerations  lead  usto  suspect  that  there  is  some- 
thing, wrong  with  the  popular  conception  of  patriotism.  And 
yet  the  value  of  patriotism  may  well  be  admitted.  The  great 
cultural  states  have  been_of  immense  benefit  in  the  progress  of 


8  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

humanity.  And  patriotism  has  been  their  mainstay  of  sup- 
port. There  must  be,  therefore,  some  basis  upon  which  patriot- 
ism is  to  be  justified. 

II.  Is  LOYALTY  A  GOOD  per  sef 

Patriotism  is  a  special  form  of  loyalty.  It  is  loyalty  to  the 
state.  An  examination  of  patriotism  may  well  begin,  therefore, 
with  a  preliminary  consideration  of  loyalty  in  general.  ,  And 
in  this  connection  there  must  be  noticed  the  viewpoint  which 
would  make  loyalty  a  good  per  se.  This  viewpoint  is  developed 
by  Professor  Royce  in  his  Philosophy  of  Loyalty.  In  this jDOok 
there  is  an  attempt  to  make  loyalty  the  foundation  of  the  en- 
tire ethical  system.  "In  loyalty,  when  loyalty  is  properly  de- 
fined, is  the  fulfilment  of  the  whole  moral  law."  (p.  15) 

In  the  beginning  of  the  book,  Royce  calls  attention  to  the 
great  perplexity  of  the  present  age  in  regard  to  its  moral  ideals 
and  its  standards  of  duty.  Morality  can  not  be  a  mere  external 
restraint  upon  the  individual.  True  morality  is  identical  with 
the  individual's  own  inmost  desire,  the  real  purpose  of  his  life, 
as  opposed  to  what  merely  seems  to  him  at  some  particular 
moment  to  be  his  purpose.  But "  I  can  never  find  out  what  my  own 
will  is  by  merely  brooding  over  my  natural  desires,  or  by  follow- 
ing my  momentary  caprices.  .  .  .  From  moment  to  mo- 
ment, if  you  consider  me  apart  from  my  training,  I  am  a  col- 
lection of  impulses.  There  is  no  one  desire  that  is  always 
present  to  me. "  (p.  27)  Without  such  a  unifying  purpose  one 
may  exist  as  a  psychological  specimen,  but  not  as  a  true  per- 
sonality. This  personal  problem  of  unifying  life  and  giving  it 
significance,  of  answering  the  question:  For  what  do  I  live? 
can  be  solved  only  by  the  establishment  of  loyalty  to  some 
cause.  The  man  who  is  heartily  loyal  to  a  great  cause  has 
found  the  purpose  of  his  life,  his  deep  and  abiding  will,  in  the 
desire  to  further  this  cause.  "Loyalty  .  .  .  tends  to  unify 
life,  to  give  it  centre,  fixity,  stability."  (p.  22) 

Royce  defines  loyalty  provisionally  as  "the  willing  and  practi- 
cal and  thoroughgoing  devotion  of  a  person  to  a  cause."  (p.  16) 
It  is  freely  accepted  by  the  individual,  is  expressed  in  some  sort 
of  action,  and  is  entire.  "He  is  ready  to  live  or  to  die  as  the 
cause  directs."  (p.  18)  By  a  cause,  Royce  means  something 
outside  of,  or  larger  than,  the  private  self.  It  is  never  private 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  9 

advantage.  "The  devotion  of  the  loyal  man  involves  a  sort 
of  restraint  or  submission  of  his  natural  desires  to  his  cause." 
(p.  18)  Royce  furthermore  indicates  that  a  cause  is  a  real 
entity  of  some  sort.  You  can  not  be  loyal  to  individuals.  "  You 
can  be  loyal  only  to  a  tie  that  binds  you  and  others  into  some 
sort  of  unity,  and  loyal  to  individuals  only  through  the  tie." 
(p.  20)  A  cause  is  not  an  impersonal  abstraction,  but  "an 
union  of  various  selves  into  one  life."  (p.  52)  "The  social 
will  is  a  concrete  entity,  just  as  real  as  we  are,  and  of  still  a 
higher  grade  of  reality  than  ourselves. "  (p.  312)  This  dis- 
position on  the  part  of  Royce  to  treat  a  cause  as  a  living  being 
is  characteristic  of  his  Idealistic  point  of  view. 

So  far  we  have  not  considered  the  nature  of  the  cause  to  which 
one  is  loyal.  "One  may,  for  the  time,  abstract  from  all  ques- 
tions as  to  the  value  of  causes.  Whether  a  man  is  loyal  to  a 
good  cause  or  to  a  bad  cause,  his  own  personal  attitude,  when  he 
is  loyal,  has  a  certain  general  quality.  Whoever  is  loyal,  what- 
ever be  his  cause,  is  devoted,  is  active,  surrenders  his  private 
self-will,  controls  himself,  is  in  love  with  his  cause,  and  believes 
in  it.  The  loyal  man  is  thus  in  a  certain  state  of  mind  which 
has  its  own  value  for  himself."  (p.  22)  "And  loyalty  is  for 
the  loyal  man  not  only  a  good,  but  for  him  chief  amongst  all 
the  moral  goods  of  his  life,  because  it  furnishes  to  him  a  personal 
solution  of  the  hardest  of  human  practical  problems,  the  prob- 
lem: 'For  what  do  I  live?'"  (p.  57) 

Such  is  Royce's  initial  position.  The  extreme  nature  of  this 
position  is  apparent.  Loyalty  is  not  only  a  good  per  se,  but,  at 
least  for  the  individual  himself,  it  is  THE  GOOD  per  se.  In  the 
course  of  his  book,  however,  Royce  is  obliged  to  make  three 
qualifications  which,  in  my  opinion,  entirely  change  the  char- 
acter of  this  initial  position. 

In  a  chapter  dealing  with  possible  objections  to  the  theory, 
there  occurs  the  following  one.  A  critic  may  say  that  loyalty 
"tends  to  take  the  life  out  of  a  young  man's  conscience,  because 
it  makes  him  simply  look  outside  of  himself  to  see  what  his 
cause  requires  him  to  do.  In  other  words,  loyalty  seems  to  be 
opposed  to  the  development  of  that  individual  autonomy  of 
the  moral  will."  (p.  64)  "Only  your  own  will,  brought  to  a 
true  knowledge  of  itself,  can  ever  determine  for  you  what  your 
duty  is. "  (p.  79)  The  autonomy  of  the  will  is  preserved  and 


10  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

the  objection  is  disposed  of  by  the  requirement  that  one  be  free 
to  choose  his  cause.  "  Nobody  else  shall  determine,  apart 
from  this  your  own  choice,  the  special  loyalty  that  shall  be 
yours."  (p.  93)  "No  convention  can  predetermine  my  per- 
sonal loyalty  without  my  free  consent. "  (p.  226) 

This  qualification  constitutes  what  may  be  called  the  first 
refinement  that  Royce  finds  it  necessary  to  make  in  order  to 
fit  loyalty  for  its  place  as  the  basis  of  his  ethical  system.  Our 
opportunities  for  loyalty  seem  to  come  to  us  from  without. 
Our  family  and  our  country  are  matters  in  whose  determina- 
tion we  ordinarily  have  no  choice.  Royce  recognizes  that  a 
mere  acceptance  of  external  circumstances,  and  an  organi- 
zation of  life  upon  the  basis  of  these  circumstances,  is  not  enough 
to  constitute  a  true  moral  life.  Thus  one  must  be  free  in  the 
choice  of  his  loyalty.  But  this  provision  leaves  one  free  to 
renounce  his  family  and  his  country  in  the  pursuit  of  such  causes 
as  a  Platonic  community  of  wives  and  children,  anarchy  and 
internationalism.  Thus  the  theory  is  getting  away  from  what 
is  commonly  meant  by  loyalty.  And  there  are  yet  more  qualifi- 
cations to  follow. 

So  far  we  have  disregarded  the  question  of  the  value  of  the 
particular  cause  selected.  And  Royce  maintains  throughout 
that  even  a  mistaken  loyalty  has  value  and  is  better  than  no 
loyalty  at  all.  He  is  careful  to  point  out,  however,  that  the 
theory  as  it  stands  is  unsatisfactory.  A  robber  band  or  a  pirate 
crew  may  fulfil  all  the  requirements  that  we  have  heretofore 
laid  down  for  our  cause.  "Yet  most  of  us  would  easily  agree 
in  thinking  such  causes  unworthy  of  anybody's  loyalty.  More- 
over, different  loyalties  may  obviously  stand  in  mutual  conflict. "" 
(p.  109)  "The  fact  that  loyalty  is  good  for  the  loyal  does  not 
of  itself  decide  whose  cause  is  right  when  various  causes  stand 
opposed  to  one  another."  (p.  Ill)  A  conflict  of  loyalties,  as 
in  war,  is  obviously  an  evil;  "and  at  least  part  of  the  reason 
why  it  is  an  evil  is  that,  by  reason  of  ...  the  war,  a  certain 
good,  namely,  the  enemy's  loyalty,  together  with  the  enemy's 
opportunity  to  be  loyal,  is  assailed,  is  thwarted,  is  endangered, 
is,  perhaps,  altogether  destroyed.  .  .  .  The  militant  loyalty, 
indeed,  also  assails,  in  such  a  case,  the  enemy's  physical  comfort 
and  well-being,  his  property,  his  life;  and  herein,  of  course, 
militant  loyalty  does  evil  to  the  enemy.  But  if  each  man's 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  11 

having  and  serving  a  cause  is  his  best  good,  the  worst  of  the 
evils  of  a  feud  is  the  resulting  attack "  upon  "his  loyalty  itself." 
(p.  115)  "And  so,  a  cause  is  good,  not  only  for  me,  but  for 
mankind,  in  so  far  as  it  is  essentially  a  loyalty  to  loyalty,  that  is, 
is  an  aid  and  a  furtherance  of  loyalty  in  my  fellows."  (p.  118) 
"In  so  far  as  my  cause  is  a  predatory  cause,  which  lives  by  over- 
throwing the  loyalties  of  others,  it  is  an  evil  cause,  because  it 
involves  disloyalty  to  the  very  cause  of  loyalty  itself."  (p. 
119)  "In  choosing  and  in  serving  the  cause  to  which  you  are  to 
be  loyal,  be,  in  any  case,  loyal  to  loyalty."  (p.  121)  Our  author 
indicates  that  the  freedom  of  choice  upon  which  he  has  insisted 
makes  it  possible  for  us  to  select  our  loyalties  with  this  aim  in 
view.  "What  cause  could  be  more  worthy  than  the  cause  of 
loyalty  to  loyalty;  that  is,  the  cause  of  making  loyalty  prosper 
amongst  men?"  (p.  125)  The  cause  of  loyalty  to  loyalty  is 
best  served,  however,  through  the  medium  of  particular  causes. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Royce  attributes  the  chief  evil 
arising  out  of  a  conflict  between  loyalties  not  to  injuries  to  the 
lives  and  well-being  of  the  sufferers,  but  to  the  fact  that  such 
persons  are  deprived  of  their  opportunity  of  being  loyal.  If  they 
lose  their  lives,  obviously  they  are  deprived  of  this  opportunity. 
But  lesser  injuries  seem  to  foster  the  spirit  of  loyalty.  Loyalty 
develops  most  completely  in  the  face  of  opposition.  Royce 
himself  complains  that  the  loyalties  which  seem  most  developed 
in  our  own  country  "far  too  often  take  the  form  of  a  loyalty 
to  mutually  hostile  partisan  organizations,  or  to  sects,  or  to 
social  classes,  at  the  expense  of  loyalty  to  the  community  or  to 
the  whole  country."  (p.  229)  And  he  later  strongly  empha- 
sizes the  fact  that  loyalty  is  strengthened  by  grief  and  defeat. 
The  example  of  lost  causes  shows  us  how  a  cause  "may  be 
furthered  by  what  seems  at  first  most  likely  to  discourage 
loyalty,  that  is,  by  loss,  by  sorrow,  by  worldly  defeat. "  (p.  280) 
"Man's  extremity  is  loyalty's  opportunity."  (p.  281)  "Loy- 
alty is  never  raised  to  its  highest  levels  without  such  grief." 
(p.  284) 

Practical  loyalty  can  exist  only  in  the  face  of  some  sort  of 
opposition.  And  we  often  find  this  opposition  in  the  form  of 
an  opposing  loyalty.  Thus  it  would  seem  that  if  loyalty  is 
itself  the  highest  good,  and  if  we  really  want  to  promote  it,  our 
course  lies,  not  in  the  way  of  mutual  adjustments  between 


12  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

opposing  loyalties,  as  Royce  thinks,  but  rather  in  the  direction 
of  fostering  conflicts.  War  has  been  invaluable  in  the  promo- 
tion of  loyalty.  Even  if  death  is  one's  fate,  is  it  not  better  to 
have  answered  the  call  of  one  supreme  purpose  and  thus  to  have 
achieved  true  personality,  than  to  have  lived  a  longer  life  as  a 
mere  psychological  specimen,  without  purpose  and  without 
significance?  If  one  is  inclined  to  look  upon  war  with  disfavor, 
as  Royce  is,  (p.  13)  still  would  not  our  partisan  and  class  struggles 
be,  not  an  evil  as  he  infers,  but  a  means  of  promoting  man's 
highest  welfare?  Of  course  the  opposition  necessary  for  the 
growth  of  loyalty  does  not  necessarily  take  the  form  of  an  op- 
posing loyalty.  The  opposition  to  the  movement  may  take 
the  form  of  ignorance,  sloth,  or  indifference.  One  may  be  loyal 
to  a  charitable  organization  or  to  a  hospital.  And  in  this 
case  the  external  obstacles  do  not  take  the  form  of  opposing 
loyalties.  As  will  appear  later,  the  justification  of  loyalty  to 
the  state  lies  in  quite  an  opposite  direction,  in  the  function  of 
the  state  as  a  harmonizing  agency.  But  this  loyalty  will  be 
valued  only  as  a  means  for  its  end.  In  all  such  cases  where  there 
is  an  ulterior  end  other  than  loyalty,  strife  may  well  be  avoided, 
because  its  results  are  largely  negative  in  character.  But  if 
loyalty  is  a  good  per  se,  as  Royce  holds,  there  seems  to  be  no 
reason  why  we  should  not  promote  it  by  creating  friction. 

It  is  important  to  note  the  effect  of  this  second  refinement. 
We  are  told  that  we  must  be  loyal  to  loyalty,  that  we  must 
strive  to  increase  the  total  amount  of  loyalty  in  the  world. 
And  thus,  though  with  doubtful  right,  Royce  looks  with  great 
disfavor  upon  loyalties  which  involve  a  conflict  with  other 
loyalties.  Suppose,  however,  that  one  take  Royce  at  his  word. 
In  the  case  of  two  conflicting  loyalties,  are  we  to  avoid  both? 
Such  would  seem  to  be  the  tendency  of  his  argument.  Some- 
times, of  course,  we  are  compelled  to  make  a  decision.  But  in 
other  cases  would  it  not  be  better  for  us  to  withdraw  from  the 
issue  completely,  rather  than  to  risk  the  possibility  of  being 
disloyal  to  the  cause  of  universal  loyalty?  Royce  would  object 
to  such  a  course  that  it  would  mean  one  was  not  to  be  loyal  at 
all.  However,  one  might  find  his  loyalty  in  some  extraneous 
cause.  But  Royce  shows  no  disposition  to  get  out  of  the  diffi- 
culty in  this  way.  In  another  connection  he  considers  the  case 
of  General  Lee,  where  the  issue  lay  in  a  decision  between  the 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  13 

Union  and  Confederate  armies.  We  have  no  suggestion  even 
that  Lee  might  have  avoided  the  conflict  altogether, — might 
have  gone  to  Europe,  perhaps,  and  realized  his  loyalty  in  edu- 
cational and  charitable  undertakings.  The  principle  of  the 
autonomy  of  the  will  would  have  completely  justified  such 
a  course.  According  to  Royce,  we  are  in  such  cases  to  choose 
the  cause  which  would  best  further  the  cause  of  universal 
loyalty.  That  is,  we  are  to  oppose  a  certain  form  of  loyalty  in 
the  interests  of  general  loyalty.  The  practicability  of  this 
principle  will  be  treated  later.  Here  it  is  only  important  to 
note  the  vacillation  which  Royce  shows  in  developing  his  for- 
mula of  loyalty  to  loyalty.  We  are  told  to  avoid  conflicts,  and 
yet  we  seem  to  be  told  not  to  avoid  them.  In  cases  of  doubt, 
cases  in  which  we  must  choose  between  two  opposing  loyalties, 
we  are  not  to  be  held  back  by  the  fear  that  we  may  choose 
wrongly,  and  may  thus  be  unwillingly  disloyal  to  universal 
loyalty.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  urged  to  make  a  decision, 
even  if  we  must  do  so  in  ignorance.  In  all  this  vacillation  we 
are  led  to  suspect  that  there  is  some  fundamental  good  other 
than  loyalty,  and  that  instead  of  being  the  end  itself,  loyalty  is 
but  the  means.  The  significant  point  is  not  the  fact  that 
Royce  holds  the  very  questionable  doctrine  that  conflicting 
loyalties  are  opposed  to  the  development  of  the  greatest  amount 
of  loyalty  in  mankind  in  general,  but  that  he  clearly  perceives 
the  impossibility  of  erecting  an  ethical  system  based  upon 
mutual  strife.  If  A.  and  B.  are  adherents  of  conflicting  causes, 
we  can  not  find  the  essential  merit  of  each  in  a  quality  involving 
their  mutual  conflict.  There  must  be  some  unity  in  correct 
ethical  endeavor.  Our  individual  moral  activities  may  not  be 
identical,  but  at  least  they  will  be  supplementary  parts  of  a 
coherent  whole.  But  such  considerations  would  lead  one  to 
place  the  significance  of  moral  action  not  in  a  quality  such  as 
loyalty,  but  in  some  ulterior  goal. 

Our  author  now  proceeds  to  develop  his  doctrine,  and  to 
substantiate  his  assertion  that  in  loyalty  is  to  be  found  the  ful- 
filment of  the  entire  moral  law.  All  of  the  commonplace  virtues 
may  be  reduced  to  loyalty.  Self-cultivation,  the  maintenance 
of  personal  rights,  justice,  and  benevolence  receive  their  sanc- 
tion from  loyalty.  A  cause,  moreover,  colors  all  one's  moral 
viewpoints.  It  becomes  one's  conscience.  "Every  cause 


14  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

worthy  ...  of  lifelong  service,  and  capable  of  unifying  our 
life  plans,  shows  sooner  or  later  that  it  is  a  cause  which  we  cannot 
successfully  express  in  any  set  of  human  experiences  of  transient 
joys  and  of  crumbling  successes."  (p.  386)  " My  cause  .  .  . 
is  greater  than  my  individual  life.  Hence  it  always  sets  before 
me  an  ideal  which  demands  more  of  me  than  I  have  yet  done. " 
(p.  173)  "My  one  ideal  is  always  something  that  stands  over 
against  my  actual  life;  and  each  act  of  this  life  has  to  be  judged, 
estimated,  determined,  as  to  its  moral  value,  in  terms  of  the 
ideal.  My  cause,  therefore,  as  it  expresses  itself  to  my  own 
consciousness  through  my  personal  ideal, — my  cause  and  my 
ideal  taken  together,  and  viewed  as  one,  perform  the  precise 
function  which  tradition  has  attributed  to  conscience. "  (p. 
173)  It  is  thus  true  that  conscience  varies  from  person  to  per- 
son. Conscience  may  be  fallible,  but  it  is  the  best  guide  we 
have. 

As  Royce  has  remarked,  conscience  is  fallible.  And  it  is 
never  more  so  than  when  the  individual  is  absorbed  in  a  cause. 
There  is  nothing,  perhaps,  which  will  twist  our  moral  judgments 
more  than  a  strong  loyalty.  We  may  lose  ourselves  in  passion, 
or  may  become  corrupted  by  vice,  but  we  generally  have,  in 
these  cases,  a  distinct  feeling  that  we  are  wrong.  The  dangerous 
character  of  loyalty  consists  in  the  fact  that  we  are  so  sure  wre 
are  right.  Nothing  is  more  self-righteous  than  a  great  enthu- 
siasm. It  is  particularly  in  the  field  of  religion  that  the  crimes 
of  loyalty  are  most  noticeable.  Think  _of the  persecutions^ 

inquisitions,  and  massacres  which  have  occurred  because  people 

have  let  their  cause  run  away  with  their  consciences!  And  this 
danger  exists  more  or  less  throughout  all  the  manifestations  of 
loyalty.  Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  effect  of 
patriotism  upon  our  moral  judgments.  Loyalty,  consequently, 
always  contains  an  element  of  danger.  Thus  is  emphasized 
the  great  need  of  rational  loyalty,  and  the  extreme  care  neces- 
sary in  the  selection  of  causes.  And  loyalty  does  not  seem  to 
be  so  much  of  a  good  per  se  as  Royce  thinks. 

Our  attention  is  now  turned  to  problems  arising  out  of  a 
conflict  of  duties.  If  we  must  choose  between  two  loyalties, 
does  our  principle  of  loyalty  to  loyalty  help  us  in  making  our 
choice?  It  is  in  this  connection  that  Royce  considers  Lee's 
case.  Would  our  principle  have  enabled  him  to  decide  whether 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  15 

his  allegiance  lay  with  the  Federal  Government  or  with  the 
state  of  Virginia?  A  brave  attempt  is  made  to  meet  this  situa- 
tion, but  the  discussion  shows  plainly  that  the  principle  is  not 
decisive  in  such  cases.  Thus  we  read:  "After  a  certain  waiting 
to  find  out  whatever  I  can  find  out,  I  always  reach  the  moment 
when  further  indecision  would  of  itself  constitute  a  sort  of  de- 
cision,— a  decision,  namely,  to  do  nothing,  and  so  not  to  serve 
at  all."  (p.  189)  This  our  principle  forbids.  One  must  have 
a  cause.  Therefore,  "decide,  knowingly  if  you  can,  ignorantly 
if  you  must,  but  in  any  case  decide,  and  have  no  fear. "  (p.  189) 
But  we  must  stick  to  our  decisions  once  made.  "  Having  sur- 
rendered the  self  to  the  chosen  special  cause,  loyalty,  precisely 
as  loyalty  to  loyalty,  forbids  you  to  destroy  the  unity  of  your 
own  purposes,  and  to  set  the  model  of  disloyalty  before  your 
fellows,  by  turning  back  from  the  cause  once  chosen,  unless 
indeed  later  growth  in  knowledge  makes  manifest  that  further 
service  of  that  special  cause  would  henceforth  involve  unques- 
tionable disloyalty  to  universal  loyalty."  (p.  190) 

The  principle  of  loyalty  to  loyalty  is,  consequently,  as  Royce 
himself  admits,  not  entirely  satisfactory.  It  would  be  rash  to 
demand  of  a  moral  principle  that  it  automatically  solve  all 
problems  arising  out  of  a  conflict  of  duties.  But  yet  one  feels 
that  even  a  resort  to  the  rules  of  customary  morality  would  be 
preferable  to  reliance  upon  the  vague  principle  of  trying  to 
decide  how  to  secure  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  loyalty 
in  mankind.  Again  there  is  felt  the  need  of  defining  a  more 
positive  goal  for  human  life,  and  of  finding  the  means  of  attain- 
ing this  goal.  Provided  only  that  such  a  goal  be  partially 
formulated,  moral  conflicts  might  be  solved  with  greater  fre- 
quency and  with  greater  rationality. 

The  latter  portion  of  The  Philosophy  of  Loyalty  is  in  part 
taken  up  with  some  practical  questions  involving  the  awaken- 
ing of  loyalty,  and  in  part  with  the  metaphysical  basis  of  the 
system.  In  this  connection  there  is  developed  the  doctrine  of 
the  Eternal,  or  Absolute.  It  would  be  out  of  place  here  to 
undertake  a  detailed  discussion  of  this  doctrine.  The  doctrine 
forms  the  key-note  of  the  author's  entire  philosophical  system. 
In  another  of  Royce's  books,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  the 
argument  is  ontological  in  character;  here  it  is  epistemological. 
Since  all  facts  are  for  Royce  facts  of  experience,  and  since  the 


16  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

facts  of  science  and  of  truth  in  general  transcend  the  limits  of 
any  human  experience,  while  yet  such  a  system  of  truth  is  a 
whole,  there  must  be  a  superhuman  unity  of  consciousness. 
This  is  the  Absolute,  or  Eternal,  "  where  our  experiences,  past, 
present,  future,  are  the  object  of  a  conspectus  that  is  not  merely 
temporal  and  transient."  (p.  337)  The  doctrine  of  the  Abso- 
lute is  also  necessitated  by  the  realistic  way  of  viewing  the 
nature  of  causes.  Royce's  conception  of  a  cause  requires  the 
unity  of  human  lives.  "  Therefore,  if  loyalty  has  any  basis 
in  truth,  human  lives  can  be  linked  in  some  genuine  spiritual 
unity."  (p.  307)  If  again  we  admit  that  all  facts  are  facts  of 
experience,  these  higher  spiritual  unities  which  can  never  be 
completely  experienced  by  any  human  consciousness,  are  facts 
present  to  the  Absolute.  "Our  philosophy  of  loyalty  is  a  ra- 
tional part  of  a  philosophy  which  must  view  the  whole  world  as 
one  unity  of  consciousness."  (p.  312) 

It  is  upon  the  basis  of  this  Absolute  Idealism  that  Royce 
redefines  the  concept  of  loyalty.  The  new  definition  may  be 
considered  as  the  third  refinement  which  Royce's  theory  under- 
goes in  the  course  of  the  book,  although  it  is  not  so  much  a  quali- 
fication of  the  theory  as  a  contradiction  of  the  entire  position. 
Royce  has  up  to  this  point  regarded  loyalty  as  a  good  per  se. 
The  development  of  loyalty  in  mankind  has  been  established 
as  the  criterion  of  morality.  But  in  the  latter  portion  of  the 
book  this  viewpoint  is  profoundly  modified. 

Royce  presents  us  with  a  criticism  pronounced  by  a  friend 
upon  the  earlier  portion  of  the  book.  "'  Loyalty  to  loyalty ' 
doesn't  seem  ultimate.  Is  it  not  loyalty  to  all  objects  of  true 
loyalty  that  is  our  ultimate  duty?  The  object,  not  the  relation, 
— the  universe  and  the  devotion  to  it,  not  the  devotion  alone, 
is  the  object  of  our  ultimate  devotion."  (p.  303)  Upon  the 
next  page  occurs  Royce's  own  rather  surprising  statement: 
"I  cordially  share  my  friend's  objection  to  the  definition  of 
loyalty  so  far  insisted  upon  in  these  lectures."  (p.  304) 

"Our  definition  of  loyalty,  and  of  its  relation  to  the  ultimate 
good  which  the  loyal  are  seeking,  has  so  far  been  inadequate. 
But,  as  I  told  you  in  the  opening  lecture,  we  deliberately  began 
with  an  inadequate  definition  of  the  nature  of  loyalty."  (p. 
304)  "We  are  loyal  not  for  the  sake  of  the  good  that  we  pri- 
vately get  out  of  loyalty,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  good  that  the 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  17 

cause — this  higher  unity  of  experience — gets  out  of  this  loyalty. 
Yet  our  loyalty  gives  us  what  is,  after  all,  our  supreme  good, 
for  it  defines  our  true  position  in  the  world  of  that  social  will 
wherein  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being."  (p.  312) 

The  final  definition  of  loyalty  is  as  follows:  "Loyalty  is  the 
will  to  manifest,  so  far  as  is  possible,  the  Eternal,  that  is,  the  con- 
scious and  superhuman  unity  of  life,  in  the  form  of  the  acts  of  an 
individual  Self."  (p.  357) 

In  The  World  and  the  Individual,  the  Absolute  is  defined  in 
terms  of  purpose.  It  is  the  supreme  purpose  of  the  universe, 
or  the  summum  bonum  embodied  in  a  superhuman  totality  of 
consciousness.  Consequently,  this  new  interpretation  of  the 
concept  of  loyalty  throws  upon  it  an  entirely  new  coloring. 
Loyalty,  in  fact,  reduces  to  this :  the  furtherance  of  the  supreme 
purpose  of  the  universe,  the  attempt  to  realize  the  summum 
bonum.  The  arguments  by  which  Royce  arrives  at  his  doctrine 
of  the  Absolute  may  be  attacked  and  discounted  by  one  of  dif- 
ferent philosophical  prejudices.  The  significant  fact,  however, 
lies  not  in  the  means  used  to  arrive  at  this  final  reinterpretation 
of  loyalty  but  in  the  consideration  that  the  reinterpretation 
was  actually  made.  Worth  or  value  exists,  not  in  a  pursuit, 
but  in  a  thing  pursued.  Loyalty  is  thus  valuable  only  as  a 
means. 

This  position  is  in  obvious  contradiction  to  the  position  taken 
earlier  in  the  book.  We  should,  it  would  now  seem,  strive  to 
advance  the  summum  bonum  embodied  in  the  Absolute,  instead 
of  trying  merely  to  increase  the  total  amount  of  loyalty  in  man- 
kind. We  are  told  specifically  that  the  justification  of  our 
loyalty  is  not  the  good  that  we  get  out  of  it  as  individuals,  but 
some  superhuman  good.  But  Royce  seems  not  to  see  the 
wide  divergence  between  these  two  different  positions.  Even 
in  the  latter  portion  of  the  book  the  view  that  loyalty  is  a  good 
per  se  is  not  discarded.  This  fact  appears  very  clearly  in  the 
thesis  that  it  is  better  to  be  loyal  to  a  false  cause  than  not  to  be 
loyal  at  all.  Loyalty  has  been  defined  as  the  service  of  the 
Eternal.  Does  Royce  mean  that  all  loyalty  is  a  furtherance  of 
this  eternal  purpose?  Evidently  not,  for  he  recognizes  the 
existence  of  unworthy  causes.  And  it  is  by  no  means  clear  how 
loyalty  to  a  cause  opposed  to  this  eternal  purpose  can  have 
any  positive  moral  value.  It  is  surely  much  better  to  be  in- 


18  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

different  to  the  cause  of  progress  than  actually  to  oppose  it. 
In  the  view  of  our  author,  however,  loyalty  always  retains  a 
certain  value  of  its  own.  Thus  he  states:  "All  lesser  loyalties, 
and  all  serving  of  imperfect  or  of  evil  causes,  are  but  fragmentary 
forms  of  the  service  of  the  cause  of  universal  loyalty."  (p.  375) 
This  statement  seems  rather  broad.  Is  the  service  of  a  robber 
band  a  fragmentary  form  of  the  service  of  the  cause  of  universal 
loyalty?  Consequently,  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  in  another 
connection  a  statement  which  acts  as  a  qualification  to  the  for- 
mer statement.  The  individual  must  sincerely  believe  in  the 
worth  of  his  cause  if  his  loyalty  is  to  have  moral  value.  "  Loy- 
alty is  good  for  a  man  precisely  because  he  believes  that  his 
cause  itself,  even  apart  from  his  service,  is  good."  (p.  301)  In 
other  words,  loyalty  is  valuable  in  itself,  whether  the  cause 
is  good  or  evil,  but  only  if  the  loyal  individual  believes  that  his 
cause  is  good.  This  statement  seems  to  be  only  another  in- 
dication that  the  emphasis  must  be  shifted  from  the  loyalty 
itself  to  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  loyalty.  A  mistaken 
loyalty  might  be  considered  good  in  its  intention,  if  those  con- 
cerned really  believe  that  the  cause  is  right.  But  it  is  perni- 
cious in  its  results.  And  in  the  case  of  the  robber  band  both 
the  intention  and  the  results  are  evil.  The  loyalty  here  in 
question  might  be  considered  good  in  so  far  as  it  is  something 
capable  of  being  turned  to  better  uses.  But  this  quality  is 
manifestly  valuable  only  for  its  possible  utility.  In  determining 
the  actual  value  of  any  particular  loyalty,  we  must  determine 
the  value  of  the  cause  to  which  it  is  applied. 

Royce  is  optimistic  enough  to  think  that  loyal  individuals 
will  natural^  be  led  toward  the  right  path  in  the  long  run. 
"The  cause  may  indeed  be  a  bad  one.  But  at  worst  it  is  our 
way  of  interpreting  the  true  cause.  If  we  let  our  loyalty  de- 
velop, it  tends  to  turn  into  the  service  of  the  universal  cause." 
(p.  383)  This  latter  assertion  may  well  be  called  into  question. 
The  loyal  service  of  a  mistaken  cause,  instead  of  leading  the 
individual  to  see  his  mistake,  is  much  more  likely  to  narrow 
and  bias  his  viewpoint  still  further.  If  we  are  to  make  the  ideal 
of  the  cause  our  conscience,  as  Royce  recommends  and  as  loyal 
people  very  generally  do,  how  are  we  ever  to  recognize  that  our 
cause  is  wrong?  These  considerations  show  the  extreme  danger 
of  considering  loyalty  as  anything  but  a  means.  But  again 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  19 

the  interesting  fact  is  not  that  Royce  has  mistaken  the  ability 
of  loyalty  to  lead  one  toward  the  true  cause,  but  that  he  has 
considered  it  necessary  to  think  that  such  was  the  case.  Evi- 
dently, in  the  last  resort,  he  can  not  get  away  from  the  supreme 
importance  of  the  cause  upon  which  loyalty  is  concentrated. 

Royce  has  started  with  the  intention  of  founding  a  system  of 
ethics  upon  loyalty.  He  has  attempted  to  maintain  that 
loyalty  is  a  good  in  itself.  But  he  has  found  it  necessary  to 
qualify  his  position  in  such  a  way  as  to  suggest  that  after  all  the 
value  of  loyalty  is  dependent  upon  the  value  of  the  cause  toward 
which  it  is  directed.  Thus  he  takes  great  care  to  state  that  we 
must  not  passively  acquiesce  in  our  loyalties,  but  must  freely 
choose  them.  Morality  should  not  be  something  merely  ex- 
ternal, but  should  have  its  roots  in  individual  volitional  au- 
tonomy. This  qualification  leaves  us  free  to  repudiate  the 
loyalties  in  which  we  naturally  find  ourselves,  and  to  acquire 
others  upon  the  basis  of  some  sort  of  selection.  If  loyalty  is 
valuable  in  itself,  why  not  accept  the  loyalties  in  which  we 
naturally  find  ourselves?  We  are  next  told  that  we  must  be 
loyal  to  loyalty,  that  we  must  choose  our  cause  so  that  the 
total  amount  of  human  loyalty  may  be  increased.  This  re- 
quirement is  interpreted  to  mean  that,  if  possible,  conflicting 
loyalties  are  to  be  avoided.  But  Royce  himself  admits  in 
another  connection  that  opposition  often  strengthens  loyalty. 
And  we  are  told  that  we  must  not  avoid  conflicts  if  such  avoid- 
ance will  mean  that  we  are  not  to  be  loyal  at  all.  Royce,  fur- 
thermore, shows  no  disposition  to  indicate  that  we  should 
withdraw  from  such  conflicts  wherever  possible  and  find  our 
loyalties  in  extraneous  causes.  All  this  vacillation  only  serves 
to  suggest  that  the  ultimate  criterion  is  not  loyalty  itself  but 
some  ulterior  principle.  As  Royce  says,  the  loyal  individual's 
cause  tends  to  become  his  conscience,  and  although  Royce 
would  not  admit  the  fact,  this  conscience  is  particularly  likely 
to  be  biased.  Royce  is  not  able  to  show  how  his  principle  of 
loyalty  to  loyalty  can  be  practicable  in  solving  moral  problems. 
And  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  book  he  redefines  loyalty  as  the 
service  of  the  supreme  purpose  of  the  universe,  the  summum 
bonum.  The  great  value  of  loyalty  lies  at  last  in  the  end  to  be 
.achieved. 


20  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

/  The  foregoing  discussion  of  The  Philosophy  of  Loyalty  has  thus 
indicated  one  fact  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  patriotism.  What- 
ever may  be  the  value  of  patriotism,  and  whatever  may  be  its 
justification,  there  is  no  value  in  the  mere  patriotism  itself. 
The  value  of  patriotism  lies  in  the  purpose  which  it  achieves. 

III.  THE  PURPOSE  OF  THE  STATE. 

The  result  of  the  preceding  section  was  to  show  that  loyalty 
has  its  ultimate  justification  in  the  end  which  it  secures.  It  i& 
valuable  only  as  a  means.  In  so  far  as  the  loyalty  narrows  and 
warps  the  individual's  moral  judgment  and  in  so  far  as  the  end 
secured  is  not  good,  the  loyalty  is  an  evil.  The  justification  of 
loyalty  lies  in  its  character  of  a  necessary  discipline  for  the 
^attainment  of  certain  valuable  ends.  Patriotism  is  the  special 
application  of  loyalty  to  the  state.  Thus  the  justification  of 
patriotism  involves  an  investigation  into  the  true  purpose  of 
the  state.  And  any  particular  patriotism  is  justified  in  the 
degree  in  which  this  true  purpose  is  realized  in  the  state  in 
question. 

The  end  for  which  the  state  exists  has  generally  been  regarded 
as  moral.  Aristotle  says  that  the  state  exists  for  the  sake  of 
good  life.  Hegel  protests  against  viewing  the  state  as  a  mere 
police  organization  with  the  sole  duty  of  affording  protection 
to  business.  For  Bosanquet  the  purpose  of  the  state  is  the  pro- 
motion of  the  "best  life"  in  its  citizens.  These  terms  are 
vague,  and  manifestly  need  a  more  concrete  formulation.  But 
the  nature  of  the  summum  bonum  is  in  itself  a  most  difficult 
problem,  and  its  discussion  would  lead  too  far  from  the  purposes 
of  the  present  thesis.  We  will  only  say,  then,  that  the  purpose 
J  of  the  state  is  to  secure  the  good  of  man,  the  most  complete  and 
harmonious  fulfilment  of  human  potentialities.  It  is  not  im- 
plied that  this  moral  purpose  needs  to  be  or  can  be  realized 
directly.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  immediate  attention  of  the 
state  is  to  be  concentrated  on  the  removal  of  hindrances  to  this 
"best  life."  The  state  can  not  legislate  its  citizens  into  being 
moral.  In  so  far  as  an  act  is  due  "to  the  hope  of  reward  or  the 
fear  of  punishment,  its  value  as  an  element  in  the  best  life  is 
ipso  facto  destroyed,  except  in  so  far  as  its  ulterior  effects  are 
concerned."  (Bosanquet,  The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State, 
p.  189)  But  a  definite  evil,  such  as  prostitution,  may  be  con- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  21 

trolled,  and  the  state  may  maintain  a  social  order  conducive  to 
the  "best  life"  of  its  citizens. 

But  now  the  question  immediately  presents  itself:  Whose 
good  is  to  be  secured?  The  most  obvious  answer  is:  The  good 
of  all  of  the  citizens.  But  this  answer  raises  numerous  problems. 
In  human  life  we  find,  apparently,  endless  conflicts.  The  good 
of  one  interferes  with  the  good  of  another.  Not  only  are  our 
courts  crowded  with  civil  litigation,  but  our  labor  troubles  are 
becoming  more  and  more  acute.  These  conflicts  the  state  en- 
deavors to  settle,  in  part  upon  theoretical  bases,  in  part  by 
considerations  of  expediency,  and  in  part  by  mere  compromises. 
In  the  attempt  to  solve  such  problems,  and  to  protect  the  rights 
of  its  citizens,  the  state  has  evolved  an  enormous  body  of  legis- 
lation. And  this  increase  of  legislation  means  a  growth  of 
restriction  and  a  diminution  of  what  might  appear  to  be  the 
chief  good  of  all,  the  specific  characteristic  of  man, — liberty. 
But  the  difficulties  do  not  stop  here.  The  matter  of  criminals 
may  be  passed  over.  It  is  not  at  all  evident  that  the  state 
seeks  their  good  in  punishment, — nor  is  it  evident  that  the  state 
should  do  so.  But  at  times  of  national  crisis  there  is  hardly 
any  limit  upon  the  sacrifice  which  the  state  may  require  from 
its  best  and  most  law-abiding  citizens.  Can  the  state  be  said 
in  any  manner  to  seek  the  good  of  the  soldier  whom  it  sends  to 
death  in  order  to  carry  out  its  purposes? 

As  an  answer  to  all  these  difficulties,  we  shall  probably  be 
told  that  it  is  the  good  of  the  " whole"  which  is  to  be  secured. 
The  individual  good  must  be  sacrificed  for  the  good  of  the 
group.  Yes,  but  if  every  individual  is  sacrificed  for  the  good  of 
the  group,  what  becomes  of  the  group?  The  real  meaning  of 
the  statement  is  that  a  few  individuals  must  be  sacrificed  for 
the  welfare  of  the  rest.  How  are  we  to  determine  which  in- 
dividuals are  to  be  sacrificed?  Why  should  I  be  sacrificed  to 
the  common  welfare  in  which  you  share,  rather  than  that  you 
should  be  sacrificed  to  the  common  welfare  in  which  I  share? 
It  is  impossible  to  make  a  graduation  of  citizens  in  terms  of 
their  value.  Neither  human  wisdom  nor  human  justice  is 
equal  to  the  task. 

And  is  not  the  whole  idea  of  sacrifice  fallacious?  There  seems 
to  be  something  sacred  about  a  human  being.  He  possesses 
his  own  absolute  worth.  He  carries  his  purposes  within  himself. 


22  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

Slavery  has  been  universally  condemned  because  it  involves  a 
disregard  of  the  value  of  this  internal  purpose.  We  are  treating 
the  slave,  not  as  a  man,  b.ut  as  a  thing.  And  does  not  the 
conception  of  sacrifice  imply  that  we  are  treating  humanity 
not  as  an  end  withal,  but  as  a  means  only? 

In  matters  of  civil  litigation  the  state  is  continually  repudi- 
ating the  inner  purpose  of  this  individual  or  of  that;  sometimes 
in  cases  of  compromise  there  is  a  partial  repudiation  of  the  pur- 
poses of  both  parties  to  the  suit.  Such  injuries  are  relatively 
innocent.  But  by  circumscribing  the  individual  with  its  mass 
of  legislative  restrictions,  the  state  is  guilty  of  a  much  more 
serious  repudiation  of  the  right  of  an  individual  to  work  out  his 
inner  purpose  in  freedom.  And  the  supreme  sacrifices  of  war 
present  the  problem  in  its  most  serious  aspect. 

In  reply  to  all  this  it  will  be  said  that  we  have  been  regarding 
the  welfare  of  mere  individuals.  We  should  seek  rather  the 
welfare  of  the  group  as  such.  Our  viewpoint  has  been  atom- 
istic. We  have  been  regarding  a  society  as  a  mere  aggregate 
of  human  beings,  with  their  individual  purposes;  whereas  we 
should  regard  it  as  a  living  organism  with  a  distinct  purpose  of 
its  own.  The  state  is  something  more  than  the  sum  of  its  citi- 
zens. It  is  a  universal  something,  existing,  no  doubt,  in  the* 
particulars,  but  a  real  universal  withal. 

A  very  natural  way  of  conceiving  of  a.  society  as  an  entity 
over  and  above  the  sum  of  its  constituents,  is  to  conceive  of  it 
as  analogous  to  a  physical  organism. 

IV.  THE  STATE  AS  AN  ORGANISM. 

Perhaps  the  earliest  conception  of  the  state  as  an  organism 
is  that  found  in  Plato's  Republic.  (Book  IV)  In  some  respects 
Plato's  conception  is  more  adequate  than  that  of  later  times, 
for  he  conceives  the  state  as  mental  rather  than  physical.  The 
comparison  is  not  between  the  classes  of  a  state  and  the  members 
of  a  physical  organism,  but  between  the  classes  of  a  state  and 
the  functions  of  the  mind.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  these  men- 
tal functions  are  localized  in  various  parts  of  the  body,  the  dif- 
ference between  Plato's  conception  and  that  of  later  times  is  not 
as  pronounced  as  it  at  first  sight  appears.  (See  Timaeus,  XXXI.) 
There  should  be  in  the  state,  according  to  Plato,  three  classes; 
a  governing  class,  corresponding  to  the  rational  faculty  in  man, 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  23 

located  in  the  head;  a  military  class,  corresponding  to  the 
spirited  faculty  in  man,  particularly  courage,  located  in  the 
chest;  and  an  industrial  class,  whose  purpose  it  is  to  feed  and 
clothe  the  state,  corresponding  to  the  appetites,  hunger,  thirst, 
sex,  located  in  the  abdomen.  Justice  results,  both  in  the  state 
and  in  the  individual,  from  a  proper  co-ordination  of  functions. 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  Plato  can  be  considered  as  a  true 
representative  of  the  organic  theory.  His  republic  is  not  a 
natural  product,  but  a  state  made  to  order.  The  tendency  of 
modern  society,  moreover,  has  been  steadily  away  from  Plato's 
division  of  classes.  We  no  longer  have  a  ruling  class,  a  military 
class,  and  an  industrial  class.  The  modern  citizen  is  expected 
to  unite  within  himself  all  three  functions.  He  is  expected  to 
engage  in  industry,  to  perform  military  service  at  times  of  need, 
and  to  guide  the  policies  of  the  state  by  means  of  popular  suf- 
frage and  public  opinion.  This  particular  doctrine  of  Plato  has 
had,  apparently,  but  little  influence  upon  subsequent  thinkers. 

An  organic  theory  of  society  is  also  to  be  found  in  St.  Paul. 
(1  Cor.  12)  Christians  are  baptized  into  the  body  of  Christ. 
A  body  consists  of  many  members  differing  in  capacity  and 
function.  This  difference  is  essential.  "If  they  were  all  one 
member,  where  were  the  body?"  These  members  are  mu- 
tually interdependent.  "The  eye  cannot  say  unto  the  hand, 
I  have  no  need  of  thee. "  Even  those  members  which  seem  to 
be  feeble  are  necessary,  and  those  members  which  seem  less 
honourable  are  not  to  be  despised.  "The  members  should 
have  the  same  care  one  for  another.  And  whether  one  member 
suffer,  all  the  members  suffer  with  it;  or  one  member  be  hon- 
oured, all  the  members  rejoice  with  it."  Some  are  apostles, 
others  prophets,  others  teachers,  others  workers  of  miracles, 
others  healers,  others  have  the  gift  of  tongues,  others  are  inter- 
preters. St.  Paul  has  in  mind  evidently  that  each  should  per- 
form his  proper  function  in  co-operation  with  his  fellows  and 
without  dissension.  All  of  this  may  be  merely  a  bit  of  the 
Apostle's  homiletics,  but  the  passage  had  a  great  influence 
during  the  Middle  Age.  (See  Gierke,  Political  Theories  of  the 
Middle  Age,  a  portion  of  Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht, 
Band  III,  translated  by  Maitland,  p.  22.) 

The  organic  theory  is  very  common  during  the  Middle  Age. 
According  to  Gierke,  "John  of  Salisbury  made  the  first  attempt 


24  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

to  find  some  member  of  the  natural  body  which  would  correspond 
to  each  portion  of  the  State.  .  .  .  Later  writers  followed  him, 
but  with  many  variations  in  minor  matters.  The  most  elaborate 
comparison  comes  from  Nicholas  of  Cues,  who  for  this  purpose 
brought  into  play  all  the  medical  knowledge  of  his  time." 
(ibid.,  p.  24)  The  social  organism,  according  to  Nicholas,  is  a 
dualism  of  soul  and  body,  represented  respectively  by  the 
priesthood  and  the  laity.  The  soul,  despite  its  unity,  operates 
in  every  member  of  the  body,  as  well  as  in  the  body  as  a  whole. 
"Thus  the  Papacy  will  be  Soul  in  the  brain;  the  Patriarchate 
will  be  Soul  in  the  ears  and  eyes;  the  Archiepiscopate,  Soul  in 
the  arms,  the  Episcopate,  Soul  in  the  fingers,  the  Curacy,  Soul 
in  the  feet,  while  Kaiser,  Kings  and  Dukes,  Markgrafs,  Grafs, 
'Rectores'  and  the  simple  laity  are  the  corresponding  members 
of  the  'corporal  hierarchy.'"  (ibid.,  p.  24)  "Still  even  in  the 
Middle  Age  there  were  not  wanting  endeavours  to  employ  the 
analogy  of  the  Animated  Body  in  a  less  superficial  manner,  and 
in  such  wise  that  the  idea  of  Organization  would  be  more  or 
less  liberated  from  its  anthropomorphic  trappings.  Already 
John  of  Salisbury  deduced  thence  the  propositions  —  indisputable 
in  themselves  —  that  a  well  ordered  Constitution  consists  in  the 
proper  apportionment  of  functions  to  members  and  in  the  apt 
condition,  strength  and  composition  of  each  and  every  member;  — 
that  all  members  must  in  their  functions  supplement  and  support 
each  other,  never  losing  sight  of  the  weal  of  the  others,  and  feel- 
ing pain  in  the  harm  that  is  done  to  another."  (ibid.,  p.  24) 

These  mediaeval  analogies,  however,  are  without  great  signi- 
ficance. One  might  find  a  few  remarks  concerning  the  dif- 
ferentiation of  function,  interdependence,  and  the  subordination 
of  part  to  whole.  But  the  argument  is  for  the  most  part  con- 
cerned with  the  establishment  of  a  more  or  less  fanciful  cor- 
respondence between  certain  social  factors  and  organs  of  the 
human  body,  —  often  with  the  ulterior  purpose  of  supporting 
either  the  Papal  or  Imperial  party. 

It  was  in  the  nineteenth  century  that  the  organic  theory  came 
into  its  own.1  Both  Hegel  and  Darwin,  though  by  very  different 


Korkunov  bases  his  statement  upon  the  contention  that  there  could  be  no 
clear  distinction  between  the  organic  and  mechanical  conceptions  until  after 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  25 

modes  of  approach,  served  to  bring  the  conception  of  the  or- 
ganism into  prominence.  And  this  idea  was  connected  essen- 
tially with  the  idea  of  development.  A  machine  is  something 
that  can  be  rationally  constructed.  Thus,  the  mechanical 
conception  of  society  is  represented  by  the  theories  of  social 
contract.  An  organism  is  the  product  of  a  long  course  of  evol- 
ution; to  know  it  one  must  know  its  history.  And  when  we 
say  that  society  is  an  organism,  we  mean  that  its  laws  of  develop- 
ment are  those  of  the  development  of  life  generally. 

It  is  upon  this  basis  that  Herbert  Spencer  endeavors  to  es- 
tablish the  organic  theory  of  society.  Spencer  emphatically 
repudiates  anthropomorphism.  A  society  may  not  be  compared 
to  any  particular  kind  of  organism.  But  the  general  features 
of  societies  are  those  of  organisms. 

A  society  is  composed  of  individual  units.  Also  "the  life 
of  every  visible  organism  is  constituted  by  the  lives  of  units 
too  minute  to  be  seen  by  the  unaided  eye. "  (The  Principles  of 
Sociology,  Vol.  I,  p.  453)  "  Blood  is  a  liquid  in  which,  along 
with  nutritive  matters,  circulate  innumerable  living  units — 
the  blood  corpuscles."  (p.  454)  "By  a  catastrophe  the  life  of 
the  aggregate  may  be  destroyed  without  immediately  destroy- 
ing the  lives  of  all  its  units;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  no 
catastrophe  abridges  it,  the  life  of  the  aggregate  is  far  longer 
than  the  lives  of  its  units."  (p.  455)  This  statement  applies 
equally  to  physical  organisms  and  to  societies. 

Both  societies  and  organisms  grow.  This  growth  may  take 
place  by  two  methods.  There  may  be  an  increase  by  the  simple 
multiplication  of  units,  of  cells  in  the  organism,  and  of  persons 
in  the  society.  But  there  is  also  in  societies  a  method  of  growth 

the  appearance  of  the  vital  theory,  due  to  Bichat,  in  1801.  Earlier  theories 
regarded  the  body  as  a  machine.  Between  the  spiritistic  and  the  material- 
istic or  mechanical  theory  proper  the  difference  was  only  that  in  one  case 
the  body  was  considered  to  act  as  the  passive  instrument  of  the  soul,  and 
in  the  other  case  automatically.  In  either  case  the  body  was  a  machine. 
Bichat  ushers  in  a  new  conception.  According  to  him,  there  are  special 
vital  properties  in  the  living  organism.  Unlike  the  physical  properties  of 
matter,  these  vital  properties  are  transmissible  from  one  particle  of  matter 
to  another.  "All  life  is  only  a  long  struggle  between  physical  and  vital 
properties.  Health  and  disease  are  merely  different  phases  of  it.  Recovery 
is  a  victory  of  the  vital  properties  and  death  of  the  physical  ones."  (Kor- 
kunov,  p.  272) 

Whatever  we  may  think  of  this  physiology,  we  have  here  clearly  set  forth 
the  idea  of  an  organism  with  a  purpose  distinct  from  that  of  its  component 
parts,— if  we  may  dignify  physical  and  chemical  properties  with  the  name 
of  purpose. 


26  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

by  the  union  of  groups.  Is  there  anything  to  correspond  to- 
this  in  Biology?  Spencer  answers  in  the  affirmative,  and  points 
to  cryptogams  and  Coelenterata.  Along  with  growth,  goes 
differentiation  of  structure  and  function.  "The  lowest  type  of 
animal  is  all  stomach,  all  respiratory  surface,  all  limb."  (p.  451) 
As  evolution  proceeds,  different  functions  come  to  be  performed 
by  different  organs,  which  grow  more  and  more  unlike  each 
other.  Similarly  in  a  primitive  society,  each  man  is  a  warrior, 
a  hunter,  and  a  hut-builder.  Civilization  is  accompanied  by  an 
ever  increasing  diversity  in  the  number  of  occupations.  This 
growth  in  diversity  is  in  both  cases  accompanied  by  a  growth 
in  interdependence.  In  primitive  organisms,  one  organ  may 
perform  the  function  of  another,  just  as  in  primitive  societies 
one  person  may  assume  the  occupation  of  another.  As  evol- 
ution proceeds  in  both  cases,  this  possibility  of  transfer  is  con- 
stantly decreased.  Low  organisms,  whose  parts  are  all  similar 
to  each  other,  can  be  separated,  and  both  parts  will  continue  to 
live.  "We  cannot  cut  a  mammal  in  two  without  causing  im- 
mediate death."  (p.  486)  Each  organ  has  its  particular  func- 
tion, and  the  loss  of  any  important  function  is  fatal.  Similarly, 
primitive  societies  can  be  cut  off  from  one  another  with  little 
annoyance.  But  "Middlesex  separated  from  its  surroundings 
would  in  a  few  days  have  all  its  social  processes  stopped  by 
lack  of  supplies."  (p.  486)  In  both  organisms  and  societies, 
what  we  may  call  the  vitality  or  intensity  of  life  is  in  direct 
proportion  to  this  differentiation  of  function. 

As  we  ascend  in  the  course  of  evolution,  there  occurs  the 
gradual  differentiation  of  three  systems.  First  comes  the  sus- 
taining system,  the  part  of  the  body  concerned  with  nutrition, 
the  alimentary  canal.  Then  comes  the  regulating  system,  the 
part  of  the  body  which  deals  with  the  outer  environment,  the 
nervous  system  and  the  limbs.  Third,  after  the  differentiation 
has  progressed  to  a  certain  degree,  comes  the  distributive  or 
vascular  system,  which  carries  nourishment  to  all  parts  of  the 
body. 

There  occurs  a  similar  division  in  societies.  The  sustaining 
system  is  represented  by  the  productive  industries.  The  regu- 
lating system  is  represented  by  the  governmental  and  military 
organization.  The  distributive  system  is  represented  by  the 
trading  classes.  Of  these,  the  most  important,  in  the  present 
connection,  is  the  regulating  system. 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  27 

The  nervo-motor  system  of  animals  is  developed  as  a  means  of 
dealing  with  the  outer  environment.  Other  animals  must  be 
caught  for  food,  or  must  be  escaped  from.  This  requires  an 
ever  increasing  amount  of  co-ordination  and  centralization. 
As  we  ascend  the  scale  in  animal  evolution,  we  find  an  ever 
increasing  nerve  centralization.  What  were  originally  relatively 
independent  local  ganglia,  become  subordinated  to  a  central 
organ.  Governments,  likewise,  have  been  developed  as  a 
means  of  dealing  with  external  foes.  And  the  frequency  of 
war  has  steadily  tended  to  produce  a  strong,  centralized  govern- 
ment. In  the  evolution  of  animals,  also,  the  governing  centers 
are  progressively  superseded  by  higher  centers,  and  the  earlier 
centers  become  more  automatic.  The  highest  center  comes  to 
be  the  seat  of  deliberation;  and  it  controls  the  actions  of  the 
body  through  the  agency  of  the  lower  more  automatic  centers. 
In  governments,  the  earlier  executive  organs  are  likewise  super- 
seded by  deliberative  bodies.  These  earlier  organs  become 
more  and  more  automatic,  limiting  themselves  to  the  immediate 
supervision  of  affairs  under  the  direction  of  the  deliberative 
bodies.  Thus  the  spinal  cord  may  be  compared  to  the  king; 
the  medulla  oblongata  and  the  sensory  ganglia  to  the  ministry; 
and  the  cerebrum  and  cerebellum  to  parliament.  The  nerves 
of  the  body  correspond  to  the  means  of  communication  in 
society. 

There  occurs  now  a  further  complication  in  the  theory.  The 
cerebro-spinal  system  is  concerned  mostly  with  external  activi- 
ties. But  we  find  also  a  secondary  nervous  system  in  the  body, 
practically  independent  of  the  former,  which  regulates  internal 
actions.  This  is  the  sympathetic  system.  In  modern  societies, 
the  industrial  life  has  become  largely  independent.  Govern- 
mental interference  has  decreased,  and  business  is  left  to  regu- 
late itself  in  accordance  with  its  own  intrinsic  laws.  Thus  we 
have  a  relatively  independent  industrial  regulating  system. 
There  is  also  in  animals  a  third  nervous  system,  the  vaso-motor, 
which  governs  the  distribution  of  blood.  In  society  this  func- 
tion is  performed  by  the  banks,  which  extend  to  any  local 
industry  during  periods  of  unusual  activity  an  extension  of 
credit  "so  that  there  takes  place  a  dilatation  of  the  in-flowing 
streams  of  men  and  commodities."  (p.  546)  Thus  the  distri- 
buting system  has  its  own  regulating  apparatus.  Centralized 


28  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

control,  as  represented  by  the  cerebro-spinal  system,  is  charac- 
teristic of  a  military  state;  while  a  decentralized  control  and 
lack  of  governmental  interference,  as  represented  by  the  sym- 
pathetic system,  is  characteristic  of  an  industrial  state. 

So  far  the  analogy  seems  very  plausible.  As  will  appear 
later,  Spencer  himself  insists  upon  a  qualification  which  robs 
his  theory  of  all  significance.  But  for  the  time  being  it  will  be 
best  to  leave  Spencer,  and  consider  the  implications  of  the 
organic  theory  in  relation  to  patriotism.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  organic  theory  of  society  is  a  very  common  one 
to  the  nineteenth  century,  and  is  by  no  means  identified  with 
Spencer.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Spencer  has  been  selected  in 
the  present  instance,  not  because  he  is  such  a  good  representa- 
tive of  the  theory,  but  because  he  is  such  a  bad  one. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  serious  difficulties  were  found  to 
be  involved  in  the  conception  that  the  purpose  of  the  state  is 
the  realization  of  the  good  of  all  of  its  citizens.  Being  accused 
of  atomism,  and  fearing  that  we  were  on  the  wrong  track  alto- 
gether, we  then  asked  if  the  state  could  have  a  purpose  distinct 
from  the  purposes  of  its  citizens.  Such  a  viewpoint  suggests 
that  the  state  is  an  entity  of  some  sort,  and  the  question  was 
raised:  Can  the  state  be  regarded  as  comparable  to  a  physical 
organism?  The  arguments  have  just  been  noticed  by  which 
such  an  analogy  may  attempt  to  substantiate  itself. 

What  would  be  the  meaning  of  patriotism  in  such  a  theory? 
It  would  naturally  seem  to  imply  the  subordination  of  the  in- 
dividual to  the  whole.  The  activity  of  every  portion  of  the 
organism  is  distinctly  subordinate  to  the  purpose  of  the  whole. 
The  purpose  of  the  organism  is  distinct  from  the  purposes  of 
its  parts.  Thus  in  the  state  the  purpose  of  each  individual 
would  be  subordinate  to  the  purpose  of  the  state  itself,  which 
would  be  something  distinct  from  the  purposes  of  its  citizens. 

Of  course,  the  welfare  of  the  state  is,  in  a  sense,  the  welfare  of 
its  citizens;  just  as  the  welfare  of  the  organism  is  also  the  wel- 
fare of  its  members.  And  no  doubt  the  organism  is  best  off 
when  all  its  parts  are  in  good  condition.  There  may  be  some  pain 
when  there  is  injury  to  any  part  of  the  body.  But  the  different 
parts  of  the  body  are  important  in  vastly  different  degrees. 
Certain  portions  of  the  body  may  easily  be  sacrificed  for  the 
.sake  of  other  more  vital  portions.  Consequently,  the  state 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  29 

would  consider  the  good  of  all  of  its  citizens,  but  in  radically 
different  degrees. 

Furthermore,  in  a  physical  organism,  certain  members  are 
employed  to  do  rough  physical  labor.  Certain  members  seem 
especially  adapted  for  the  purpose  of  enjoying  themselves. 
Some  members  naturally  command;  others  can  only  obey. 
These  differences  are  not  transient  and  temporary  ones,  but  are 
innate  and  permanent.  Would  the  analogy  therefore  imply  a 
rigidly  stratified  society,  in  which  a  few  dictated,  the  many 
obeyed,  some  performed  the  menial  duties,  while  others  were 
especially  expected  to  enjoy  themselves? 

These  implications  of  the  organic  theory  were  clearly  per- 
ceived by  the  Schoolmen.  "From  the  notion  of  an  Organism, 
whose  being  involves  a  union  of  like  with  unlike,  was  derived 
the  necessity  of  differences  in  rank,  profession  and  estate,  so 
that  the  individuals,  who  were  the  elements  in  ecclesiastical  and 
political  Bodies,  were  conceived,  not  as  arithmetically  equal 
units,  but  as  socially  grouped  and  differentiated  from  each 
other."  (Gierke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  27-28.  In  a  note  there  is  a  refer- 
ence, among  others,  to  St.  Thomas.)  "Lastly  from  the  nature 
of  an  Organism  was  inferred  the  absolute  necessity  of  some 
Single  Force,  which  as  summum  movens,  vivifies,  controls  and 
regulates  all  inferior  forces.  Thus  we  come  to  the  proposition 
that  every  Social  Body  needs  a  Governing  Part  (pars  princi- 
pans)  which  can  be  pictured  as  its  Head  or  its  Heart  or  its  Soul. 
Often  from  the  comparison  of  Ruler  to  Head  the  inference  was 
at  once  drawn  that  Nature  demanded  Monarchy,  since  there 
could  be  but  one  head."  (ibid.,  p.  28) 

Thus  we  have  the  picture:  a  strong  centralized  state,  prefer- 
ably a  monarchy,  characterized  by  gradations  of  rank,  and 
corresponding  inequalities.  It  was  because  of  these  implica- 
tions of  the  theory  that  Tolstoy  so  vigorously  attacked  it. 

In  the  essay,  What  Shall  We  Do  Then?  he  exclaims:  "How 
can  one  help  accepting  such  a  beautiful  theory!  It  is  enough 
for  me  to  view  human  society  as  an  object  of  observation,  in 
order  calmly  to  devour  the  labours  of  others  who  are  perishing, 
consoling  myself  with  the  thought  that  my  activity  as  a  dancer, 
lawyer,  doctor,  philosopher,  actor,  investigator  of  mediumism 
and  of  the  form  of  atoms  is  a  functional  activity  of  the  organ- 
ism of  humanity,  and  so  there  cannot  even  be  a  question  as  to 


30  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

the  justice  of  my  exploiting  the  labours  of  others, — I  am  only 
doing  what  is  pleasant  for  me, — as  there  can  be  no  question  as 
to  the  justice  of  the  activity  of  the  brain  cell  which  is  making 
use  of  the  muscular  labour."  (p.  229,  Wiener's  translation) 
Tolstoy  attributes  the  theory,  although  apparently  not  the 
pernicious  implications,  to  Comte.  The  passage  is  colored,  of 
course,  by  Tolstoy's  characteristic  anti-cultural  attitude. 

It  is  very  interesting  to  note  that  Spencer  does  not  accept 
these  implications  of  the  theory.  By  one  of  the  strangest 
freaks  of  fortune  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  the  advocacy  of 
the  organic  theory  of  societies  has  here  been  placed  in  the  mouth 
of  a  particularly  rabid  individualist.  Spencer  is  very  careful 
to  point  out  the  differences  between  societies  and  "  other  or- 
ganisms." The  living  units  composing  a  society  are  discrete, 
are  not  in  immediate  contact  with  one  another,  and  are  more 
or  less  widely  dispersed.  This  discreteness  of  the  social  organ- 
ism prevents  "that  differentiation  by  which  one  part  becomes 
an  organ  of  feeling  and  thought,  while  the  other  parts  become 
insensitive."  (op.  cit.,  p.  460)  "There  are,  indeed,  traces  of 
such  a  differentiation."  "The  mechanically- working  and  hard- 
living  units  are  less  sensitive  than  the  mentally-working  and 
more  protected  units."  But  there  is  "a  cardinal  difference  in 
the  two  kinds  of  organisms.  In  the  one,  consciousness  is  con- 
centrated in  a  small  part  of  the  aggregate.  In  the  other,  it  is 
diffused  throughout  the  aggregate."  "As,  then,  there  is  no 
social  sensorium,  the  welfare  of  the  aggregate,  considered  apart 
from  that  of  the  units,  is  not  an  end  to  be  sought.  The  society 
exists  for  the  benefit  of  its  members;  not  its  members  for  the 
benefit  of  the  society."  (p.  461) 

In  the  Revue  Philosophique  for  May,  1877,  M.  Henri  Marion 
published  a  criticism  of  Spencer's  theory,  to  the  following 
effect:  The  most  highly  developed  animals  have  well  co-ordi- 
nated nervous  systems,  whereby  they  may  secure  prey  and 
escape  their  enemies.  In  accordance  with  the  analogy,  the  most 
highly  developed  states  should  be  military  states  with  strong 
centralized  governments  exercising  rigid  control  over  the  indi- 
vidual. But  Spencer  considers  as  the  higher  type  the  indus- 
trial state  with  decentralized  authority  and  a  general  laissez- 
faire  theory.  In  a  postscript  added  to  his  book,  Spencer  sum- 
marizes M.  Marion's  remarks,  and  gives  an  explanation.  He 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  31 

admits  the  analogy  breaks  down.  Individual  organisms, 
whether  low  or  high,  have  to  maintain  their  lives  by  offensive 
or  defensive  activities,  or  both.  Hence  the  need  for  a  co- 
ordinated regulating  system.  It  is  otherwise  with  societies. 
Doubtless  during  the  militant  stages  of  social  evolution  the 
societies  having  the  most  centralized  regulating  systems,  are, 
relatively  to  the  temporary  requirements,  the  highest.  But  re- 
latively to  the  ultimate  requirements,  that  is,  when  war  shall 
have  been  transcended,  societies  will  be  high  or  low  in  pro- 
portion to  the  evolution  of  their  industrial  systems.  This 
great  difference  is  to  be  explained  by  the  essential  differences 
between  society  and  biological  organisms.  "In  the  individual 
organism,  the  component  units,  mostly  devoid  of  feeling,  carry 
on  their  activities  for  the  welfare  of  certain  groups  of  units 
(forming  the  nervous  centres)  which  monopolize  feeling;  in  the 
social  organism,  all  the  units  are  endowed  with  feeling."  "In 
the  individual  organism,  the  units  exist  for  the  benefit  of  the 
aggregate,  in  the  social  organism  the  aggregate  exists  for  the 
benefit  of  the  units."  It  is  just  this  difference  that  causes  the 
anomaly  noted  above.  "Social  organization  is  to  be  consid- 
ered high  in  proportion  as  it  subserves  individual  welfare,  be- 
cause in  a  society  the  units  are  sentient  and  the  aggregate  in- 
sentient; and  the  industrial  type  is  the  higher  because,  in  that 
state  of  permanent  peace  to  which  civilization  is  tending,  it  sub- 
serves individual  welfare  better  than  the  militant  type."  (p. 
599) 

So  this  is  the  result  of  Spencer's  theory!  Society  is  an  organ- 
ism, but  one  in  which  the  parts  are  sentient  and  the  whole  in- 
sentient, which  has  no  intrinsic  value  in  itself  but  is  valuable 
only  in  so  far  as  it  serves  its  units,  and  which  actually  achieves 
its  highest  state  of  development  in  a  sort  of  self-effacing  process 
of  decentralization  and  weakness.  Why  call  society  an  organism 
at  all?  It  has,  indeed,  been  stated  that  Spencer  was  not  serious 
in  this  viewpoint.  In  the  last  chapter  of  Part  II  he  makes  the 
following  statement:  "But  now  let  us  drop  this  alleged  parallel- 
ism between  individual  organizations  and  social  organizations. 
I  have  used  the  analogies  elaborated,  but  as  a  scaffolding  to 
help  in  building  up  a  coherent  body  of  sociological  inductions." 
(p.  592)  However,  he  has  repeatedly  stated  that  a  society  is 
an  organism.  And  he  would  hardly  have  devoted  153  pages  to 


32  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

the  establishment  of  a  thesis  which  was  to  be  so  summarily 
discarded.  Spencer  is  here  insisting,  I  think,  that  Sociology 
must  stand  upon  its  own  feet,  and  not  gather  its  data  from  the 
material  of  Biology.  Spencer  is  perfectly  sincere  in  his  state- 
ment that  society  is  an  organism.  But  his  own  qualification 
robs  the  statement  of  almost  its  entire  meaning. 

Even  the  structural  and  functional  analogy  is  by  no  means 
proof  against  attack.  The  particular  analogies  seem  arbitrary. 
Korkunov  cites  an  illuminating  example  of  this.  "According 
to  Spencer  the  individuals  who  form  a  society  may,  according 
to  their  social  position,  be  compared  to  different  cells  of  the 
organism,  the  working  classes  corresponding  to  the  digestive 
organs,  the  ruling  classes  to  nerves,  etc.  Lilienfeld,  on  the  con- 
trary, believes  that  the  men  can  be  compared  only  to  the  nerve 
cells."  (Theory  of  Law,  pp.  276-277) 

We  have  already  noticed  that  societies  grow  by  a  process  of 
integration.  Spencer  sustains  his  analogy  here  only  by  having 
recourse  to  very  low  forms  of  organisms.  To  quote  again  from 
Korkunov:  " Growth  by  annexing  new  groups  from  without 
is  something  wholly  impossible  for  the  organism;  or  at  least 
such  growth  is  possible  only  for  organisms  presenting  the  very 
lowest  degree  of  differentiation  in  their  structure."  (ibid.,  p. 

280)  "In  social  life,  on  the  contrary,  we  meet  with  this  form  of 
growth  in  the  most  complex  social  organizations.     The  history 
of  human  societies,  also,  shows  us  numerous  examples  of  societies 
annexing  some  organ  having  a  highly  special  function  which  it 
kept  after  such  annexation,  after  entering  into  a  new  social 
aggregate.     The  history  of  modern  states  is  full  of  examples  of 
the  annexation  of  agricultural  districts,  of  industrial  centres,  of 
commercial  parts,  fortresses,  etc.,  according  to  Spencer  distinct 
organs  and  social  differentiations  of  the  social  body."  (ibid.,  p. 

281)  In  societies,  also,  we  may  have  growth  through  immigra- 
tion.    Spencer  notices  this  phenomenon,  and  admits  that  there 
is  no  parallel  to  it  in  Biology,  but  considers  it  unimportant. 
(Spencer,  op.   cit.,  p.  469)     But  according  to  Korkunov :"  It  is 
sufficient  to  recall  the  coming  of  the  negroes  into  America,  and 
in  our  day  the  beginning  of  Chinese  immigration  into  the  same 
country.     The  whole  history  of  America  gives  the  lie  direct 
to  Spencer's  theory."  (Korkunov,  op.  cit.,  p.  281) 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  33 

"The  form  of  governmental  organization  of  any  given  State 
is  in  constant  change,  and  at  times  undergoes  radical  altera- 
tion." (Willoughby,  An  Examination  of  the  Nature  of  the  State, 
p.  36)  The  form  of  biological  organization  on  the  other  hand 
is  practically  permanent,  and  radical  alterations  are  either 
impossible  or  fatal.  "In  the  organism,  the  laws  of  development , 
though  acting  from  within,  are  blindly  and  intuitively  followed; 
while  the  growth  of  the  State,  though  also  from  within,  is,  to  a 
considerable  extent  at  least,  consciously  felt,  and  the  form  of  its 
organization  self-directed."  (Willoughby,  op.  cit.,  p.  37) 

But  the  essential  defect  of  the  analogy,  as  Spencer  himself 
saw,  occurs  in  the  respective  relations  of  the  whole  to  its  con- 
stituent parts.  According  to  Tolstoy:  "Humanity  lacks  the 
essential  sign  of  an  organism,  a  centre  of  sensation  and  of  con- 
sciousness." (op.  cit.,  p.  232)  Consequently,  the  individuals 
of  a  society  are  vastly  more  independent  than  are  the  cells  of  an 
organism.  "Though  the  will  of  the  State  is  not  identical  with 
the  wills  of  its  constituent  units,  yet,  unlike  the  will  of  the 
natural  organism,  it  is  one  that  is  influenced  and  largely  deter- 
mined by  such  individual  volitions.  Furthermore,  the  exist- 
ence and  activities  of  these  units  are  not  exhausted  in  the  life 
and  activity  of  the  State.  Not  only  is  their  organic  life  inde- 
pendent of  the  State's  existence,  but  their  entire  spiritual  being 
is  uncontrolled  by  it."  (Willoughby,  pp.  35-36)  " Contrasted 
with  these  characteristics,  the  living  being  is  an  aggregate  whose 
parts  exist  solely  to  support  and  continue  the  life  of  the  whole. 
The  individual  units  have  no  life  of  their  own,  no  independent 
powers  of  volition  or  action.  Also,  while  in  the  organism  the 
tendency  is  for  the  influence  and  control  of  the  whole  over  the 
action  of  its  parts  to  increase  not  only  in  exactness  but  in  scope, 
this  is  not  the  necessary  tendency  in  the  State,  whose  control, 
though  tending  to  become  more  and  more  perfect,  at  the  same 
time  secures  to  the  individual  a  continually  increasing  sphere 
of  free  undetermined  action."  (Willoughby,  p.  36) 

Korkunov  brings  up  similar  objections:  "In  the  organism 
each  cell  participates  in  a  sole  rigorously  determined  function. 
The  same  cell  cannot  be  by  turns  a  bone  and  a  nerve  cell.  In 
society,  on  the  other  hand,  we  find  this  diversity  in  the  functions 
of  a  single  individual.  The  same  person  may  be  successively 
a  laborer  on  the  soil,  a  corporation's  secretary,  member  of  a 


34  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

jury,  or  of  a  city  council,  of  a  legislative  assembly  or  even  presi- 
dent of  the  republic."  (Korkunov,  op.  cit.,  p.  282)  Again: 
"The  cell  is  always  simply  and  exclusively  an  attribute  of  a 
single  organism.  It  has  no  power  to  participate  at  the  same 
time  in  the  life  of  several  organisms."  But  "subjects  of  the 
Russian  state  .  .  .  may  be  of  Germanic  nationality  and  be- 
long at  the  same  time  to  the  Catholic  Church."  (ibid.,  p.  285) 
"If  in  the  organism  the  independence  of  the  distinct  cells  is  in 
inverse  proportion  to  the  development  of  the  organism  as  an 
entirety,  we  cannot  establish  on  the  other  hand  in  the  social 
life  that  the  independence  of  the  members  of  the  same  society 
diminishes  as  the  development  of  the  society  augments.  Quite 
the  contrary,  individual  independence  is  one  of  the  prime  con- 
ditions of  social  development.  Where  the  development  of 
individual  thought  is  stifled,  the  growth  of  the  social  ideal  is 
impossible;  society  retrogrades,  finds  its  development  paralyzed, 
its  internal  as  well  as  external  relations  less  active."  (ibid.,  pp. 
294-295) 

The  analogy  between  an  organism  and  a  society  is  at  best 
but  a  partial  analogy.  In  any  statement  of  the  theory,  these 
exceptions  must  be  carefully  noted.  Consequently,  there 
seems  to  be  no  reason  for  calling  society  an  organism  at  all. 
We  may  say,  if  you  like,  that  the  phenomena  of  society  present 
certain  likenesses  to  those  of  developing  life,  but  we  must 
immediately  add  that  there  are  certain  unlikenesses.  And  the 
analogy  has  a  pernicious  tendency  when  taken  seriously.  I  do 
not,  of  course,  pretend  that  there  are  no  differences  of  value 
among  citizens.  But  the  organic  theory  suggests  that  these 
differences  are  intrinsic,  necessary,  and  rather  to  be  desired  than 
to  be  avoided.  Each  cell  in  an  organism  has  its  distinct  place 
allotted  to  it;  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  equal  opportunity. 
And  the  welfare  of  certain  cells  is  distinctly  subordinate  to  the 
welfare  of  others.  We  are,  in  fact,  back  at  our  old  difficulty. 
We  are  seeking  to  use  human  beings  as  a  means,  not  as  an  end; 
and  as  a  means,  not  only  to  the  welfare  of  the  state,  but  incident- 
ally to  the  welfare  of  other  human  beings. 

After  noting  the  problems  involved  in  the  apparent  conflicts 
between  the  welfare  of  one  citizen  and  the  welfare  of  another, 
we  endeavored,  if  you  remember,  to  see  if  we  could  not  look  for 
the  welfare  of  a  nation  in  the  purpose  of  the  state  as  such,  con- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  35 

reived  of  as  something  distinct  from  the  sum  of  its  citizens. 
But  the  organic  theory  is  of  questionable  validity,  and  seems 
to  embody  the  principle  of  inequality,  which  we  shall  avoid 
if  possible.  Let  us  see  if  we  can  not  conceive  of  the  state  in 
such  a  way  as  to  avoid  this  inequality,  in  such  a  way  as  to  do  no 
violence  to  the  ideas  of  equal  opportunity  and  equal  consider- 
ation of  the  purposes  of  all. 

V.  THE    STATE    AS    A    PERSONALITY — INTRODUCTION. 

The  organic  theory  has  not  been  the  only  historic  method  of 
viewing  the  state  as  a  unity.  We  often  hear  the  state  spoken 
of  as  a  "  personality. "  The  holders  of  such  a  theory,  it  is  true, 
often  speak  of  the  state  as  an  organism,  and  there  is  more  or 
less  talk  about  the  differentiation  of  function,  co-ordination, 
and  interdependence.  We  are  told  that  the  parts  and  the  whole 
imply  each  other  and  exist  for  the  sake  of  each  other.  But 
there  are  no  analogies  to  the  physical  organism,  and  our  atten- 
tion is  turned  to  such  features  of  a  society  as  its  common  con- 
sciousness, its  common  purpose,  and  its  common  will. 

It  has  been  the  failing  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  all  organic 
theories,  that  they  try  to  establish  their  analogy  by  showing 
the  similarity  of  structure  and  function  between  a  physical 
organism  and  a  society.  Such  a  mode  of  approach  involves  a 
fundamental  misconception  of  the  idea  of  an  organism.  An 
organism  can  not  be  denned  in  terms  of  structure;  it  must  be 
denned  in  terms  of  purpose.  The  conception  is  not  a  structural 
one,  but  a  teleological  one.  An  organism  is  not  an  aggregate 
with  certain  types  of  organs  performing  certain  types  of  func- 
tions. An  aggregate  from  some  other  planet  might  possess  an 
entirely  different  structure  from  any  organism  we  know,  along 
with  corresponding  peculiarities  of  function.  Yet  we  might 
recognize  it  as  an  organism.  An  organism  is  essentially  an 
aggregate  which  acts  in  accordance  with  an  internal  purpose. 
And  this  purpose  is  something  distinct  from  the  physical  and 
chemical  properties  of  the  component  parts.  If  the  state  is  an 
organism,  the  state  possesses  such  an  internal  purpose  distinct 
from  the  natural  tendencies  of  the  individual  citizens.  It  is  the 
especial  fault  of  Spencer  that  he  takes  great  pains  to  establish 
a  structural  and  functional  analogy,  and  denies  in  society  the 
essential  attribute  of  an  organism, — an  internal  unified  purpose. 


36  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

For  historical  reasons,  the  term  organism  has  been  used  in 
accordance  with  Spencer's  use  of  it.  But  it  may  be  remembered 
that  the  real  truth  of  the  organic  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the 
theory  which  conceives  of  the  state  as  a  personality.  In  this 
theory,  or  at  least  in  a  special  form  of  it,  there  is  clearly  formu- 
lated the  idea  of  a  unity  of  purpose,  distinct  from  the  purposes 
of  the  citizens,  that  is,  superficially  distinct  from  these  purposes. 
And  this  theory,  unhampered  with  analogies  to  the  physical 
organism,  strives  to  avoid  the  difficulties  of  inequality  and  sacri- 
fice. 

The  idea  that  a  group  of  human  individuals  may  itself  be  a 
person,  is  descended  from  Roman  law.  The  idea  is  first  applied, 
not  to  the  state,  but  to  lesser  bodies  such  as  municipalities  and 
corporations.  According  to  Sohm,  "the  rule  evolved  by  Roman 
law  during  the  period  of  the  classical  jurisprudence  may  be 
stated  as  follows:  the  property  of  a  corporation  is  the  property, 
not  of  several  persons,  but  of  a  single  person,  to  wit,  the  'corpus/ 
or  corporation  as  such.  For  purposes  of  private  law,  the  cor- 
poration, the  collective  whole,  must  be  regarded  as  a  new,  a 
different  person,  as  an  individual  distinct  from  the  several 
individuals  of  whom  the  corporation  consists."  "The  indivi- 
dual members  of  the  corporation  cannot  be  made  answerable 
for  the  debts  of  the  corporation.  Rights  and  liabilities  of  a 
corporation  do  not  mean  joint  rights  and  joint  liabilities  of  the 
members,  but  sole  rights  and  sole  liabilities  of  another  person, 
an  invisible,  a  'juristic'  person,  namely,  the  'corpus.'"  (Sohm's 
Institutes  of  Roman  Law,  translated  by  Ledlie,  pp.  199-200) 

There  have  been  in  subsequent  times  three  ways  of  viewing 
such  groups  of  human  individuals.  According  to  one  view- 
point, such  a  group  is  merely  an  aggregate  of  persons  under 
contract  with  one  another.  This  viewpoint  tends  to  get  away 
from  the  idea  of  the  corporation  altogether  and  to  pass  over 
into  that  of  the  partnership.  This  idea  is  coupled  with  the 
societas  of  Roman  law.  The  second  viewpoint  regards  the 
corporation  as  a  universitas.  "The  universitas  is  a  person; 
the  societas  is  only  another  name,  a  collective  name,  for  the 
socii. "  (This  definition  is  to  be  attributed  to  Innocent  IV.  See 
Maitland's  Introduction  to  his  translation  of  Gierke  cited  above, 
p.  xxii;  also  Gierke,  Genossenschaftsrecht,  Band  III,  p.  285.) 
But  the  universitas  was  at  first  regarded,  not  as  a  real  person,. 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  37 

but  as  a  persona  ficta,  that  is,  as  a  legal  fiction.  It  has  been 
only  in  recent  times  that  the  real  personality  of  the  corporation 
has  been  insisted  upon. 

The  persona  ficta  doctrine  was  the  first  philosophical  explana- 
tion given  to  the  idea  of  juristic  personality.  "  According  to 
Dr.  Gierke,  the  first  man  who  used  this  famous  phrase  was  Sini- 
bald  Fieschi,  who  in  1243  became  Pope  Innocent  IV."  The 
corporation  is  a  fictitious  person.  It  is  a  pure  creation  of  the 
law.  Its  position  is  analogous  to  that  of  a  minor  or  insane 
person.  Its  directors  occupy  the  position  of  guardians.  The 
corporation  has  no  will  of  its  own.  Thus  it  can  bear  no  moral 
or  legal  responsibility.  Innocent  even  went  so  far  as  to  claim 
that  a  corporation  could  not  be  charged  with  crime  or  tort. 
(Maitland,  op.  cit.,  pp.  xix-xx;  Gierke,  Genossenschaftsrecht, 
Band  III,  p.  279) 

These  theoretical  distinctions,  of  course,  are  the  work  of  the 
Middle  Age.  They  have  only  their  faint  beginnings  in  anti- 
quity. Maitland  warns  us  against  trying  to  find  in  Roman  law 
more  than  is  really  there.  "The  number  of  texts  in  the  Digest 
which,  even  by  a  stretch  of  language,  could  be  said  to  express 
a  theory  of  Corporations  is  extremely  small."  "The  admission 
must  be  made  that  there  is  no  text  which  directly  calls  the 
universitas  a  persona,  and  still  less  any  that  calls  it  persona  ficta. " 
(Maitland,  op.  cit.,  p.  xviii) 

In  opposition  to  the  fiction  theory  is  the  theory  of  the  "real 
will,"  developed  in  recent  times  by  certain  German  legal  writers, 
notably  by  Dr.  Gierke.  According  to  this  theory,  a  corpora- 
tion is  "no  fiction,no  symbol, no  piece  of  the  State's  machinery, 
no  collective  name  for  individuals,  but  a  living  organism  and  a 
real  person,  with  body  and  members  and  a  will  of  its  own. 
Itself  can  will,  itself  can  act;  it  wills  and  acts  by  the  men  who 
-are  its  organs  as  a  man  wills  and  acts  by  brain,  mouth  and 
hand.  It  is  not  a  fictitious  person;  it  is  a  Gesammtperson,  and 
its  will  is  a  Gesammtwille;  it  is  a  group-person,  and  its  will  is  a 
group-will."  (Maitland,  op.  cit.,  p.  xxvi) 

It  would  naturally  be  thought  that  this  idea  of  real  person- 
ality or  of  a  real  will  might  have  grown  out  of  the  organic  theory 
in  the  Middle  Age,  but  the  conception  was  never  attained. 
Sometimes  the  state  is  spoken  of  as  a  person,  but  it  is  always 
regarded  as  a  persona  ficta.  "Baldus,  in  particular,  formulated 


3  8  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

with  much  precision  the  thought  of  the  State's  personality. 
.  .  .  However,  Baldus  is  the  very  man  who  lets  us  see 
clearly  that  he  regards  the  State's  Personality  merely  in  the 
light  of  the  prevalent  'Fiction  Theory'  of  the  Corporation. 
This  appears  plainly  from  his  refusal  to  attribute  Will  to  the 
State.  For  this  reason  he  holds  that  jurisdiction  delegated  by 
the  Prince  ceases  at  the  death  of  the  delegator.  If  Gulielmus 
de  Cuneo  has  argued  to  the  contrary,  urging  that  the  Empire 
continues  to  exist  and  therefore  that  the  delegator  is  not  dead, 
he  has  (so  says  Baldus)  overlooked  the  fact  that  here  we  have 
to  do,  not  with  the  Empire,  but  with  the  Emperor;  for,  be  it 
granted  that  the  Empire  remains  unchanged,  still  the  Will 
which  is  expressed  in  the  act  of  delegation  is  the  Emperor's, 
not  the  Empire's,  for  the  Empire  has  no  Mind  and  therefore  no 
Will,  since  Will  is  mental."  (Gierke,  Political  Theories  of  the 
Middle  Age,  pp.  69-70) 

The  persona  ficta  doctrine,  however,  naturally  hindered  the 
growth  of  the  conception  of  the  state  as  a  person.  The  state, 
indeed,  was  regarded  at  times  as  a  persona  ficta,  but  the  theory 
was  not  promising.  "A  merely  fictitious  personality,  created 
by  the  State  and  shut  up  within  the  limits  of  Private  Law,  was 
not  what  the  philosopher  wanted  when  he  went  about  to  con- 
struct the  State  itself."  (Maitland,  op.  cit.,  p.  xxiii)  The  doc- 
trine of  personality  was  not  applied  to  the  state,  because  the 
only  available  interpretation,  that  of  the  persona  ficta,  was 
inadequate. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  that  all  power  comes  ultimately 
from  the  governed,  with  its  attendant  idea  of  a  contract  between 
people  and  ruler,  brought  forward  the  conception  of  the  societas 
as  opposed  to  the  universitas.  For  the  question  was  asked: 
"How  did  it  happen  that  this  Community  itself,  whose  Will, 
expressed  in  an  act  of  transfer,  was  the  origin  of  the  State,  came 
to  be  a  Single  Body  competent  to  perform  a  legal  act  and  possess- 
ing a  transferable  power  over  its  members?"  (Gierke,  Political 
Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  p.  88)  "More  and  more  decisively 
was  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  very  union  of  men  in  a  politi- 
cal bond  was  an  act  of  rational,  human  Will."  (ibid.,  p.  89} 
"Thus  in  the  end  the  Medieval  Doctrine  already  brings  the 
hypothetical  act  of  political  union  under  the  category  of  a 
Contract  of  Partnership  or  'Social'  Contract."  (ibid.,  p.  90) 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  39 

The  conception  of  a  social  contract  is  the  theory  par  excellence 
of  early  modern  theorists.  Upon  the  basis  of  this  theory,  the 
state  becomes  a  mere  aggregate  of  independent  units  under 
contract  with  one  another.  This  is  apparently  the  very  anti- 
thesis of  any  theory  of  the  state's  essential  unity.  And  yet  the 
most  satisfactory  modern  conception  of  the  state's  personality 
was  destined  to  take  its  birth  in  these  surroundings.  It  is 
Rousseau  who  is  the  founder  of  the  doctrine  of  the  general  will, 
and  the  very  title  of  the  book  in  which  this  view  is  propounded 
is  The  Social  Contract!  We  are  lead  to  think  that,  Hegelian- 
wise,  the  idea  of  the  personality  of  the  state  must  first  pass  over 
into  its  opposite  before  coming  to  its  own  truest  formulation. 

VI.  THE  GENERAL  WILL  IN  ROUSSEAU. 

A  very  serious  difficulty  in  all  theories  of  social  contract  is 
that  of  the  basis  of  political  obligation.  The  original  contract 
was  generally  regarded  as  a  necessarily  unanimous  agreement. 
But  questions  immediately  presented  themselves  as  to  the 
extent  of  this  primary  agreement.  Succeeding  legislation  could 
not  be  regarded  as  unanimous.  How  far  is  a  man  obligated  to 
measures  of  which  he  does  not  approve,  or  to  measures  pre- 
judicial to  his  interests?  Can  not  a  majority  be  as  tyrannical 
over  a  minority  as  any  despot?  Moreover,  freedom  is  the 
natural  status  of  man,  but  does  not  man  lose  his  freedom  in 
the  face  of  ever  increasing  legislative  restrictions? 

This  problem  is  very  acute  for  Rousseau.  The  problem  is, 
as  he  states  it:  "'To  find  a  form  of  association  which  shall  de- 
fend and  protect  with  the  public  force  the  person  and  property 
of  each  associate,  and  by  means  of  which  each,  uniting  with  all, 
shall  obey  however  only  himself,  and  remain  as  free  as  before. ' ' 
(Rousseau,  The  Social  Contract,  translated  by  Harrington,  Book 
I,  Chapter  6)  This  statement  involves  the  atomistic  concep- 
tion of  a  precedent  'state  of  nature/  It  is  true  that  according 
to  Rousseau  this  state  of  nature  and  the  consequent  contract 
are  not  necessarily  to  be  taken  as  historical  facts,  but  yet  they 
are  logically  implied.  Rousseau  presents  throughout  a  curious 
mingling  of  two  radically  different  points  of  view. 

Rousseau  solves  his  problem  by  conceiving  of  the  State  as  a 
'moral  entity'  embodying  a  'general  will.'  "'Each  of  us  gives 


40  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

In  common  his  person  and  all  his  force  under  the  supreme  direc- 
tion of  the  general  will;  and  we  receive  each  member  as  an  in- 
divisible part  of  the  whole.'  Immediately,  instead  of  the  in- 
dividual person  of  each  contracting  party,  this  act  of  association 
produces  a  moral  and  collective  body,  composed  of  as  many 
members  as  the  assembly  has  votes,  which  receives  from  this 
same  act  its  unity, — its  common  being,  its  life  and  its  will." 
(Book  I,  Chapter  6)  Rousseau  makes  it  clear  in  other  places 
that  this  moral  and  collective  body  is  not  an  abstraction,  but  a 
real  entity  of  some  sort.  (I,  7;  III,  1)  The  essential  attribute 
of  this  moral  body  is  its  embodiment  of  the  general  will.  This 
doctrine  assumes  the  existence  of  a  common  welfare, —  of  a 
condition  in  which  eacjj  finds  his  true  welfare  in  harmony  with 
that  of  his  fellows.  £j^For  if  the  opposition  of  individual  in- 
terests has  rendered  the  establishment  of  societies  necessary, 
it  is  the  accord  of  these  same  interests  which  has  rendered  it 
possible.  It  is  what  is  common  in  these  different  interests 
which  forms  the  social  tie;  and  if  there  were  not  some  point, 
upon  which  all  interests  were  in  accord,  no  society  could  exist. 
Now  it  is  solely  through  this  common  interest  that  society  should 
be  governed."  (II,  1)  "As  long  as  subjects  submit  only  to 
such  agreements,  they  obey  nobody  but  their  own  wills." 
(II,  4)  Thus  "it  is  false  that  in  the  social  contract  there  is 
any  real  renunciation  on  the  part  of  the  individual, — so  false 
that,  on  the  contrary,  their  situation  is,  from  the  effect  of  this 
contract,  really  preferable  to  what  it  was  before,  and  that 
instead  of  an  alienation,  they  have  made  an  advantageous  ex- 
change of  a  mode  of  life  which  was  uncertain  and  precarious  for 
another,  better  and  more  sure,— of  natural  independence  for 
liberty."  (II,  4)  Rousseau  has  previously  stated  his  problem 
as  that  of  finding  a  mode  of  association  which  would  leave  the 
individual  as  free  as  he  was  before.  Bosanquet  very  appro- 
priately remarks  that  if  we  recognize  the  fact  that  man  has  a 
social  nature,  that  his  capacities  can  be  developed  only  in 
society,  then  man  is  not  merely  as  free  as  he  was  before,  but 
very  much  more  free;  free,  indeed,  strictly  speaking,  under 
social  conditions  alone.  (The.  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State, 
pp.  89-90) 

£rhe  general  will  is  the  true  common  welfare.  It  is  the  real, 
as  opposed  to  the  apparent,  interest  of  the  citizens;  what  they 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  41 

really  want,  not  necessarily  what  they  think  they  want.  Now 
as  long  as  the  state  is  guided  by  the  general  will,  it  is  manifest 
that  the  citizens  have  no  need  to  fear  oppression.  But  can  the 
state  rely  upon  the  citizens  to  fulfil  their  duty  toward  it? 
"Each  individual  can,  as  man,  have  an  individual  will  contrary 
to  or  different  from  the  general  will  which  he  has  as  a  citizen: 
his  individual  interest  may  speak  quite  differently  from  the 
common  interest;  his  absolute  and  naturally  independent  exist- 
ence may  make  him  consider  what  he  owes  to  the  common 
cause  as  a  gratuitous  contribution,  the  loss  of  which  would  be 
less  injurious  to  others  than  the  payment  of  it  would  be  onerous 
to  him,  and  regarding  the  moral  entity  which  constitutes  the 
state  as  a  legal  fiction,  because  it  is  not  a  man,  he  would  like  to 
enjoy  the  rights  of  a  citizen,  without  being  willing  to  fulfil  the 
duties  of  a  subject;  an  injustice,  the  progress  of  which  would 
cause  the  ruin  of  the  body  politic.  In  order  then  that  the 
social  compact  may  not  be  an  idle  formula,  it  includes  tacitly 
this  engagement,  which  alone  can  give  force  to  the  others,  that 
whoever  shall  refuse  to  obey  the  general  will,  shall  be  compelled 
to  it  by  the  whole  body,  which  signifies  nothing  if  not  that  he 
will  be  forced  to  be  free."  (Rousseau,  op.  cit.,  I,  7) 

Is  this  individual  will  the  real  interest  of  the  individual  citi- 
zen, or  is  it  an  error  of  judgment?  There  are  many  passages 
in  Rousseau  which  intimate  that  the  true  welfare  of  each  in- 
dividual is  to  be  found  in  the  true  common  welfare.  It  is  only 
the  community  of  interests  that  makes  societies  possible;  and 
it  is  to  man's  interest  to  live  in  society.  Consequently,  there 
must  be  a  possible  harmony  between  the  true  common  welfare 
and  the  true  individual  welfare.  The  individual  who  refuses 
to  obey  the  general  will  and  who  is  compelled  to  do  so  is  spoken 
of  as  being  "forced  to  be  free."  In  this  passage  we  find  an 
intimation  of  a  higher  social  self  of  man,  against  which  he  may 
rebel,  but  in  which  he  finds  his  own  truest  will  and  freedom. 
In  describing  the  corruption  of  the  state  through  the  ascend- 
ency of  particular  interests,  Rousseau  says:  "Each  in  detach- 
ing his  interest  from  the  common  interest,  sees  that  he  cannot 
separate  it  entirely;  but  his  part  of  the  public  misfortune  seems 
nothing  to  him  compared  to  the  exclusive  good  which  he  thinks 
he  has  appropriated  to  himself.  This  particular  good  excepted, 
he  desires  the  general  well-being  for  his  own  interest  as  strongly 


42  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

as  any  other. "  (IV,  1)  In  such  expressions  as  "his  part  of 
the  public  misfortune  seems  nothing  to  him  compared  to  the 
exclusive  good  which  he  thinks  he  has  appropriated  to  himself/' 
Rousseau  apparently  indicates  that  the  individual  in  question 
is  mistaken.  There  occurs  yet  another  passage  indicating  that 
man  finds  his  own  truest  individual  welfare  in  the  social  welfare. 
"There  is  but  one  law  which,  from  its  nature,  requires  unani- 
mous consent;  it  is  the  social  compact. "  "Aside  from  the 
first  contract,  the  voice  of  the  greatest  number  always  obliges 
all  the  others;  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  contract  itself.  But, 
it  is  asked,  how  can  a  man  be  free  and  forced  to  conform  to 
wishes  which  are  not  his  own?  How  are  the  opponents  free, 
and  subject  to  laws  to  which  they  have  not  consented?  I 
reply  that  the  question  is  badly  put.  The  citizen  consents  to 
all  the  laws,  even  to  those  which  are  passed  in  spite  of  him,  and 
even  to  those  which  punish  him  when  he  dares  to  violate  one  of 
them.  The  constant  will  of  all  the  members  of  the  state  is  the 
general  will;  it  is  by  it  that  they  are  citizens  and  free.  When  a 
law  is  proposed  in  an  assembly  of  the  people,  what  is  asked  of 
them  is  not  exactly  whether  they  approve  of  the  proposition  or 
whether  they  reject  it,  but  whether  or  not  it  conforms  to  the 
general  will,  which  is  theirs;  each  one  in  giving  his  vote  gives 
his  opinion  upon  it,  and  from  the  counting  of  the  votes  is  de- 
duced the  declaration  of  the  general  will.  When,  however,, 
the  opinion  contrary  to  mine  prevails,  it  shows  only  that  I  was 
mistaken,  and  that  what  I  had  supposed  to  be  the  general  will 
was  not  general.  If  my  individual  opinion  had  prevailed,  I 
should  have  done  something  other  than  I  had  intended,  and 
then  I  should  not  have  been  free.  This  supposes,  it  is  true, 
that  all  the  characteristics  of  the  general  will  are  still  in  the 
plurality;  when  they  cease  to  be  so,  whatever  side  one  takes,, 
is  not  that  of  liberty."  (IV,  2)  This  passage  must  surely  mean- 
that  the  individual  will  and  the  social  will  are  co-implicative. 
When  my  opinion  does  not  agree  with  the  general  will,  I  am  in 
error  with  respect  to  my  own  wishes.  "The  engagements 
which  link  us  to  the  social  body  are  obligatory  only  because 
they  are  mutual,  and  their  nature  is  such  that  in  fulfilling  them 
the  individual  cannot  labor  for  others  without  working  also 
for  himself."  (11,4) 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  43 

Rousseau  seems  to  think  that  under  normal  conditions,  the 
general  will  will  become  manifest  in  the  sum  of  these  individual 
wills.  Such  a  sum  of  individual  wills  he  calls  the  "will  of  all." 
"There  is  often  a  great  difference  between  the  will  of  all  and  the 
general  will:  one  regards  the  common  interest  only;  the  other 
regards  private  interests,  and  is  only  the  sum  of  individual 
wills;  but  take  from  these  same  wills  the  plus  and  the  minus, 
which  destroy  each  other,  and  there  will  remain  for  the  sum  of 
the  differences  the  general  will."  (II,  3)  That  is,  the  general 
will  becomes  manifest  in  the  same  way  as  any  constant  factor 
in  a  succession  of  miscellaneous  data. 

But  Rousseau  recognizes  that  this  ideal  situation  does  not 
always  obtain.  The  general  will  has  been  regarded  as  the  true 
general  welfare.  "It  follows  from  the  preceding  that  the 
general  will  is  always  right,  and  always  tends  towards  public 
utility;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  deliberations  of  the 
people  always  have  the  same  rectitude.  The  people  wishes 
its  own  good  always,  but  it  does  not  always  see  it;  the  people  is 
never  corrupted,  but  it  is  often  deceived,  and  it  is  then  only 
that  it  seems  to  desire  what  is  evil. "  (II,  3) 

Rousseau  also  has  a  great  fear  of  political  parties.  "If  the 
people  being  sufficiently  informed,  deliberates,  and  citizens 
have  no  communication  with  each  other, — from  a  great  number 
of  small  differences  will  result  the  general  will,  and  the  conclu- 
sion will  always  be  good.  But  when  they  divide  into  factions 
and  partial  associations  at  the  expense  of  the  whole,  the  will  of 
each  of  these  associations  becomes  general  with  regard  to  its 
members,  and  individual  with  regard  to  the  state;  it  may  then 
be  said  that  there  are  not  as  many  voters  as  men,  but  only  as 
many  as  there  are  associations.  The  differences  become  less 
numerous  and  give  a  less  general  result.  Finally,  when  one  of 
these  associations  is  so  large  as  to  surpass  all  the  others,  you  no 
longer  have  the  sum  of  small  differences,  but  a  single  difference; 
then  there  is  no  longer  a  general  will,  and  the  opinion  which 
prevails  is  only  an  individual  opinion."  (II,  3) 

"As  long  as  men  united  together  look  upon  themselves  as  a 
single  body,  they  have  but  one  will  relating  to  the  common 
preservation  and  general  welfare."  "But  when  the  social 
knot  begins  to  relax,  and  the  state  to  weaken,  when  individual 
interests  commence  to  be  felt,  and  small  societies  to  influence 


44  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

the  great,  the  common  interest  changes  and  finds  opponents: 
unanimity  no  longer  rules  in  the  suffrages;  the  general  will  is 
no  longer  the  will  of  all;  contradictions  and  debates  arise,  and 
the  best  counsel  does  not  prevail  without  dispute.  Finally 

.  .  .  all  being  guided  by  secret  motives  think  no  more 
like  citizens  than  if  the  state  had  never  existed.  Iniquitous 
decrees  are  passed  falsely  under  the  name  of  law,  which  have  for 
object  individual  interests  only.  Does  it  follow  that  the  gen- 
eral will  is  annihilated  or  corrupted?  No;  it  is  always  constant, 
inalterable,  and  pure;  but  it  is  subordinated  to  others  which 
overbalance  it."  (IV,  1) 

Earlier  in  the  treatise,  the  securing  of  the  general  will  has  been 
regarded  as  a  comparatively  simple  matter.  The  general  will 
will  prevail,  (1)  if  the  people  are  informed,  (2)  if  they  are  not 
deceived,  (3)  if  there  are  no  political  factions.  Under  normal 
conditions,  that  is,  in  the  absence  of  gross  ignorance,  deceit,  or 
party  strife,  the  general  will  is  supposed  to  result  from  the  mere 
poll  of  individual  opinions.  In  other  passages,  Rousseau  seems 
to  confess  that  the  securing  of  the  general  will  is  not  such  a 
simple  matter  after  all.  It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  know  one's 
own  will  truly,  and  Rousseau's  poll  of  individual  opinions  is 
much  more  likely  to  result  in  a  mere  compromise  of  some  sort 
than  in  a  true  general  will.  As  Bosanquet  says,  Rousseau  is 
really  enthroning  the  will  of  all. 

Rousseau  is  by  no  means  free  from  inconsistencies.  In 
regard  to  the  subject  of  legislation  he  asks:  "How  will  a  blind 
multitude,  which  often  does  not  know  its  own  wishes,  because 
it  rarely  knows  what  is  good  for  it,  execute  of  itself  an  enter- 
prise so  great  and  difficult  as  a  system  of  legislation?  Of  itself 
the  people  always  desires  the  good,  but  of  itself  it  does  not  al- 
ways see  what  is  good.  The  general  will  is  always  right,  but 
the  judgment  guiding  it  is  not  always  enlightened."  (II,  6) 
Rousseau's  solution  is  to  have  the  laws  framed  by  a  legislator, 
after  the  Greek  model.  But  the  people  itself  must  have  the 
privilege  of  accepting  or  rejecting  his  work,  "because,  according 
to  the  fundamental  compact,  it  is  only  the  general  will  which 
is  obligatory  upon  individuals,  and  it  is  never  certain  that  an 
individual  will  will  conform  to  the  general  will,  until  after  it 
has  been  submitted  to  the  free  suffrages  of  the  people."  "We 
find  then  two  things  at  once  in  the  work  of  legislation  which 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  45 

seem  incompatible:  an  enterprise  beyond  human  strength,  and 
an  authority  to  execute  it  which  amounts  to  nothing."  (II,  7) 
Rousseau  consequently  says  that  the  legislator  must  have  re- 
course to  divine  aid  and  authority,  or  must  at  least  be  thought 
to  have  such  inspiration, — (the  text  is  vague  upon  this  point). 
Thus  we  are  told  successively  that  the  people  rarely  knows  what 
is  good  for  it,  that  the  true  common  welfare  becomes  apparent 
only  through  the  suffrages  of  the  people,  and  that  the  people 
must  be  led  to  think  that  the  laws  are  divinely  inspired. 

And,  finally,  although  Rousseau  is  the  founder  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  state's  personality  conceived  of  as  an  embodiment  of  a 
general  will,  he  still  clings  to  the  atomistic  conception  of  the 
social  contract.  I  shall  cite  one  instance  of  this  atomism. 
Since  the  general  will  is  what  each  individual  really  desires, 
each  loses  no  freedom  in  submitting  to  it.  But  in  another 
place,  Rousseau  says  that  we  must  divide  the  sovereignty  of 
the  state  by  the  number  of  citizens  to  find  out  the  influence  of 
each.  "From  which  it  follows  that  the  larger  the  state  becomes 
the  less  liberty  there  is."  (Ill,  1)  In  this  passage,  Rousseau  is 
clearly  thinking,  not  of  a  true  general  will,  but  merely  of  a  sort 
of  average  of  particular  wills  secured  by  compromise.  In 
other  places  he  appears  to  have  grasped  the  idea  of  a  true  gen- 
eral will,  embodying  the  real  as  opposed  to  the  apparent 
interest,  not  only  of  the  group  as  such,  but  of  each  individual 
in  the  group  as  well.  In  a  state  embodying  a  true  general  will, 
as  will  appear  later,  the  larger  the  state  becomes,  the  more 
liberty  there  is. 

Rousseau  had  a  considerable  influence  upon  Kant,  Fichte, 
and  Hegel.  And  thus  his  influence  has  descended  more  or  less 
to  all  members  of  the  Hegelian  School.  In  particular,  we  find 
Rousseau's  doctrine  of  the  general  will  perfected  in  the  writings 
of  Bernard  Bosanquet. 

VII.  RECENT    CONCEPTIONS    OF    THE    STATE'S    PERSONALITY. 

If  you  will  remember,  we  formerly  fell  into  difficulties  in  con- 
ceiving how  the  purpose  of  the  state  could  be  the  securing  of 
the  interests  of  all  of  its  citizens.  We  were  then  led  to  see  if  we 
could  regard  the  state  as  a  unity  of  some  sort.  If  this  was 
possible,  the  purpose  of  the  state  could  be  regarded  as  some- 
thing distinct  in  itself.  But  the  organic  theory  was  found  to 


46  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

be  doubtfully  substantiated,  and  possessing  dangerous  impli- 
cations of  inequality,  of  the  subordination  of  individuals  to 
the  state,  and  of  the  progressive  decrease  of  freedom.  We  then 
attempted  to  conceive  of  the  state  as  a  personality,  and  we 
found  the  clue  to  the  meaning  of  this  personality  in  Rousseau's 
doctrine  of  the  general  will.  But  the  clearest  exposition  of 
this  doctrine  has  yet  to  be  considered. 

In  all  doctrines  of  the  state's  personality,  the  central  dogma 
is  the  possession  of  a  general  purpose  or  will.  The  idea  of  per- 
sonality applied  to  groups  of  human  individuals  is  developed, 
of  course,  by  many  different  writers  from  different  points  of 
view.  Legal  writers  link  up  their  theory  of  the  state  with  a 
doctrine  of  corporations  in  general;  sociologists  and  philosophers 
present  us  with  many  variations  of  treatment  of  the  problem. 
The  theory  thus  presents  widely  divergent  aspects,  its  aspect 
depending  in  each  case  upon  whether  it  is  dressed  up  by  an 
Hegelian,  by  a  Sociologist,  or  by  a  student  of  corporation  law. 
To  trace  out  all  these  different  versions  of  the  theory  would  be 
an  almost  endless  task.  But  the  theories  fall,  I  believe,  into 
three  main  types.  The  state  may  be  considered  primarily  as 
a  juristic  person,  as  a  personality  in  history,  or  as  the  manifes- 
tation of  a  general  will  after  the  fashion  of  Rousseau. 

(a)  The  State  as  a  Juristic  Person. 

The  conception  of  the  state  as  a  juristic  personality  has  been 
greatly  emphasized  of  late  by  a  group  of  German  legal  writers. 
The  most  important  of  these  is  probably  Gierke,  although  no 
attempt  is  made  here  to  present  his  particular  views.  This 
conception  is  linked  up  with  a  theory  of  corporations  in  general. 
The  central  aim  of  such  writers  is  to  formulate  a  theory  which 
will  be  satisfactory  for  legal  purposes.  They  contend  that 
corporations  have  a  real  corporate  will,  which  may  be  the  sub- 
ject of  moral  and  legal  responsibility.  Corporations  are  not 
fictions  holding  a  legal  status  analogous  to  minors  and  insane 
persons.  They  are  not  mere  collections  of  individuals.  And 
the  state,  as  one  species  of  corporation,  possesses  its  own  dis- 
tinct will. 

The  state  as  a  juristic  person  is  the  subject  of  rights  at  law. 
This  may  mean  that  the  state  owns  certain  property  which  it 
keeps  for  public  use,  such  as  highways  or  parks.  The  state  may 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  47 

run  gigantic  business  enterprises,  such  as  a  public  school  system. 
Or  the  state  may  be  interested  in  maintaining  a  certain  social 
order.  In  criminal  cases  we  have  the  formula,  "The  people 
versus  John  Smith."  The  entire  conception  of  the  state  as  a 
juristic  person  is  connected  up  with  the  idea  that  the  interests 
of  the  state  are  public  interests.  The  highways  and  parks  are 
for  the  use  of  all  of  the  citizens.  Education  is  a  matter  of  general 
interest.  It  is  for  the  common  good  of  all  the  citizens  to  sub- 
jugate crime.  In  all  cases,  we  have  the  idea  of  a  common  wel- 
fare or  a  common  interest.  The  unity  of  the  state  is  a  com- 
munity of  interests.  Thus  this  conception  is  identical  in  the 
last  resort  with  that  of  the  general  will. 

(b)  The  State  as  a  Historical  Personality. 

The  state  may  also  be  conceived  of  as  a  historical  personality. 
This  viewpoint  regards  nations  as  the  dramatis  personae  of  the 
huge  drama  of  world  history.  Each  nation  presents  an  indivi- 
dual life.  It  is  born;  it  grows  to  maturity;  it  dies.  The  na- 
tion presents  a  definite  character  and  purposes  comparable  to 
the  character  and  purposes  of  a  human  individual.  The  citi- 
zen feels  himself  identified  with  the  larger  life  of  his  nation. 

Hilda  D.  Oakeley,  in  an  article  published  in  the  symposium, 
The  Theory  of  the  State,  has  expressed  something  of  this  view- 
point. The  article  discusses  the  attitude  of  the  British  public 
at  the  opening  of  the  war.  The  author  speaks  of  the  inevi- 
tableness  of  England's  decision,  "the  consciousness,  more  or 
less  vague,  that  the  result  must  follow  in  order  that  national 
character  should  express  itself  truly  in  the  circumstances  be- 
fore it."  (p.  144.  The  title  of  the  article  is  The  Idea  of  a  Gen- 
eral Will.)  The  author  asks:  "Can  the  individual  or  the 
people  as  a  whole  be  conceived  as  judging:  'This  was  as  I  should 
have  willed.  My  true  will  coincides  with  that  of  my  nation 
at  every  stage  in  which  its  history  required  a  real  affirmation 
of  will'?  Or,  'The  national  will,  of  which  I  now  am  conscious, 
and  in  which  I  share,  must  have  so  moved  in  such  a  crisis.  And 
in  what  it  will  be  in  the  future  my  will  is  concerned.  Knowing 
the  spirit  of  the  present  I  know  that  it  must  complete  the  his- 
toric universal  so  far  expressed'?  This  would  be  the  ideal,  and 
only  the  people  which  can  so  feel  is  free  in  every  sense  of  the 
term.  For  we  are  not  only  members  of  a  society  now  living, 


48  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

but  of  one  that  is  in  past  and  future.  .  .  .  Few  nations  have 
a  history  corresponding  to  this  conception,  but  some  have  more 
or  less  approached  it,  and,  as  our  own  is  alone  known  to  us 
directly,  we  may  perhaps,  without  national  egoism,  take  it  as 
an  example."  (ibid.,  pp.  158-159) 

Very  often  this  theory  takes  the  form  of  regarding  the  state 
as  the  bearer  of  a  historic  mission.  This  idea  is  especially 
strong  in  Germany,  beginning  with  the  idealism  of  Fichte. 
Even  Bernhardi  has  a  chapter  on  "  Germany's  Historical  Mis- 
sion." And  this  fact  may  well  lead  to  a  discussion  of  the  dan- 
ger of  the  conception.  Idealism  is  never  without  a  certain 
amount  of  danger.  The  theory  may  easily  grow  into  the  wor- 
ship of  an  abstraction.  Too  often  the  idea  of  a  historic  mis- 
sion results  in  the  blind  following  of  an  ideal  which  in  no  way 
represents  the  true  interests  of  the  people,  either  present  or 
future.  We  may  allow  ourselves  to  be  played  upon  emotion- 
ally by  appeals  to  "the  sacred  traditions  of  our  country,"  or 
"our  country's  honor,"  when  it  would  be  better  for  us  and  the 
country  too  if  we  forgot  all  about  them. 

This  way  of  thinking  has  also  a  strong  tendency  to  keep  alive 
old  quarrels.  In  some  primitive  societies,  a  murder  might  be 
avenged  on  any  member  of  the  murderer's  family.  If  there 
were  any  further  retaliatory  measures  taken,  a  family  feud 
would  result.  In  this  process,  each  family  took  on  more  and 
more  the  character  of  a  unity  in  which  individuals  were  lost. 
The  entire  family  is  blamed  for  acts  for  which,  at  least  in  the 
beginning,  only  individuals  are  responsible.  It  is  upon  grounds 
similar  to  these  that  Norman  Angell  attacks  the  theory  of  the 
state's  personality.  And  there  is  no  doubt,  I  believe,  that  the 
theory  does  tend  to  keep  alive  hereditary  enmities  somewhat 
after  the  fashion  of  Kentucky  feuds. 

The  conception  of  the  state  as  a  historical  personality,  how- 
ever, like  the  preceding  legal  conception,  involves  the  ideas  of 
a  common  purpose,  a  common  will,  and  a  common  welfare. 
The  value  of  the  theory  lies  in  its  teaching  that  the  welfare  of 
the  present  generation  is  linked  with  that  of  past  and  future. 
The  advantages  which  we  now  enjoy  have  been  due  in  part  to 
the  struggles  of  our  forefathers.  And  it  is  our  duty,  as  well  as 
one  of  our  strongest  desires,  to  provide  for  the  interests  of  our 
children.  We  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  of  this  true 
community  of  interests  between  past,  present,  and  future. 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  49 

(c)  The  State  as  the  Embodiment  of  a  General  Will, — Bosanquet. 

The  third  way  of  conceiving  of  the  personality  of  the  state  is 
to  regard  the  state  as  the  manifestation  of  a  general  will.  For 
an  illustration  of  this  theory,  we  shall  turn  to  Bosanquet's 
book,  The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State. 

There  is  an  initial  distinction  in  Bosanquet  between  what  a 
person  really  wants,  and  what  he  merely  thinks  he  wants. 
Even  the  individualists  must  admit  this  distinction.  John 
Stuart  Mill  admitted  that  it  would  be  no  restraint  upon  the 
liberty  of  a  man  to  keep  him  off  an  untrustworthy  bridge,  as  he 
certainly  does  not  want  to  be  drowned.  According  to  Bosan- 
quet, "My  will  or  yours,  as  we  exercise  it  in  the  trivial  routine 
of  daily  life,  does  not  fulfil  all  that  it  implies  or  suggests.  It  is 
narrow,  arbitrary,  self -contradictory.  It  implies  a  'true*  or 
'real'  or  'rational'  will,  which  would  be  completely,  or  more 
completely,  what  ours  attempts  to  be,  and  fails. "  (The  Philoso- 
phical Theory  of  the  State,  p.  108)  This  true  interest  generally 
requires  some  degree  of  energy  or  effort,  perhaps  of  self-sacri- 
fice; while  the  apparent  interest  is  merely  that  caprice  of  the 
moment  by  which  many  are  always  determined.  "A  compari- 
son of  our  acts  of  will  through  a  month  or  a  year  is  enough  to 
show  that  no  one  object  of  action,  as  we  conceive  it  when  acting, 
exhausts  all  that  our  will  demands.  Even  the  life  which  we 
wish  to  live,  and  which  on  the  average  we  do  live,  is  never  be- 
fore us  as  a  whole  in  the  motive  of  any  particular  volition. 
In  order  to  obtain  a  full  statement  of  what  we  will,  what  we  want 
at  any  moment  must  at  least  be  corrected  and  amended  by  what 
we  want  at  all  other  moments;  and  this  cannot  be  done  without 
also  correcting  and  amending  it  so  as  to  harmonise  it  with  what 
others  want,  which  involves  an  application  of  the  same  process 
to  them.  But  when  any  considerable  degree  of  such  correction 
and  amendment  had  been  gone  through,  our  own  will  would 
return  to  us  in  a  shape  in  which  we  should  not  know  it  again, 
although  every  detail  would  be  a  necessary  inference  from  the 
whole  of  wishes  and  resolutions  which  we  actually  cherish." 
(ibid.,  pp.  118-119)  "What  we  really  want  is  something  more 
and  other  than  at  any  given  moment  we  are  aware  that  we  will, 
although  the  wants  which  we  are  aware  of  lead  up  to  it  at  every 
point."  (p.  119) 

Man  finds  his  freedom  in  the  realization  of  his  higher  self. 
Liberty  "must  be  a  condition  relevant  to  our  continued  struggle 


50  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

to  assert  the  control  of  something  in  us,  which  we  recognise 
as  imperative  upon  us  or  as  our  real  self."  (p.  127)  "In  the 
conflict  between  that  which  stands  for  the  self  par  excellence 
and  that  which,  at  any  time,  stands  opposed  to  it,  we  have  the 
clear  experience  that  we  are  capable  of  being  determined  by  a 
will  within  our  minds  which  nevertheless  we  repudiate  and  dis- 
own, and  therefore  we  feel  ourselves  to  be  like  a  slave  as  compared 
with  a  freeman  if  we  yield,  but  like  a  freeman  compared  with  a 
slave  if  we  conquer."  (p.  141)  "Thus  it  is  that  we  can  speak, 
without  a  contradiction,  of  being  forced  to  be  free.  It  is  pos- 
sible for  us  to  acquiesce,  as  rational  beings,  in  a  law  and  order 
which  on  the  whole  makes  for  the  possibility  of  asserting  our 
true  or  universal  selves,  at  the  very  moment  when  this  law  and 
order  is  constraining  our  particular  private  wills  in  a  way  which 
we  resent,  or  even  condemn."  "And  because  such  an  order  is 
the  embodiment  up  to  a  certain  point  of  a  self  or  system  of  will 
which  we  recognise  as  what  ought  to  be,  as  against  the  indolence, 
ignorance,  or  rebellion  of  our  casual  private  selves,  we  may 
rightly  call  it  a  system  of  self-government  or  free  government. " 
(p.  127) 

Bosanquet  assumes  that  this  true  will  of  the  individual  is 
identical  with  the  true  will  of  the  group.  "It  is  that  identity 
between  my  particular  will  and  the  wills  of  all  my  associates  in 
the  body  politic  which  makes  it  possible  to  say  that  in  all  social 
co-operation,  and  in  submitting  even  to  forcible  constraint, 
when  imposed  by  society  in  the  true  common  interest,  I  am 
obeying  only  myself,  and  am  actually  attaining  my  freedom." 
(p.  107) 

The  disposition  to  achieve  this  true  common  interest  is  called 
the  general  will.  The  general  will  is  not  a  mere  sum  of  indivi- 
dual caprices.  It  is,  in  Rousseau's  phraseology,  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  will  of  all.  Even  a  unanimous  decision  may 
not  result  in  a  general  will.  "The  supposed  accordant  deci- 
sions of  all  the  voters,  as  guided  each  by  his  strictly  private 
interest,  are  not  really  or  completely  accordant."  "They  ex- 
press no  oneness  of  life  or  principle;  still  less  can  they  give 
voice  to  any  demand  of  the  greater  or  rational  self  in  which  the 
real  common  good  resides."  (pp.  113-114)  "It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  the  private  interest  as  such,  which  in  the  case  supposed 
determines  the  individual  voter,  is  not  ultimately  his  true 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  51 

interest;  and  it  may  be  said,  'But  if  each  followed  his  own  true 
interest  the  Will  of  All  would  be  right/  But  a  true  interest, 
as  opposed  to  an  apparent  interest,  necessarily  has  just  the 
characters  which  the  true  Universal  has  as  against  the  collec- 
tion of  particulars,  or  the  General  Will  against  the  Will  of  All. 
So  that  to  say,  'If  everyone  pursued  his  own  true  private  in- 
terest the  Will  of  All  would  be  right, '  is  merely  to  say,  '  If  every- 
one pursued  his  true  private  interest  he  would  pursue  the  com- 
mon interest."  (p.  114)  "Let  us  suppose  that  Themistocles 
had  been  beaten  in  the  Athenian  assembly  when  he  proposed 
that,  instead  of  dividing  the  revenue  from  the  silver  mines 
among  ail  the  citizens,  they  would  devote  this  revenue  annually 
to  building  a  fleet — the  fleet  which  fought  at  Salamis. "  (p.  114) 
This  would  be  an  instance  in  which  the  will  of  all,  which  could 
be  conceived  to  be  unanimous,  would  not  be  the  general  will. 
The  true  general  will,  thus,  is  analogous  to  the  true  individual 
will.  It  is  what  people  really  want,  not  what  they  think  they 
want.  "What  people  demand  is  seldom  what  would  satisfy 
them  if  they  got  it."  (p.  118) 

The  individual  and  the  group  may  apparently  be  at  odds,  but 
their  true  interests  can  not  contradict  one  another.  Laws  and 
institutions  are  only  possible  because  man  has  a  general  will, 
that  is,  "because  the  good  which  he  presents  to  himself  as  his 
own  is  necessarily  in  some  degree  a  good  which  extends  beyond 
himself,  or  a  common  good."  (p.  122)  "It  is  such  a  'real'  or 
rational  will  that  thinkers  after  Rousseau  have  identified  with 
the  State."  (pp.  149-150) 

Bosanquet's  identification  of  the  true  welfare  of  the  indivi- 
dual with  the  true  welfare  of  the  state  is,  however,  a  mere  asser- 
tion. The  book  is  full  of  statements  to  the  effect  that  this 
identification  exists,  but  we  are  not  told  why  and  how  it  exists. 
The  question  immediately  arises  as  to  whether  this  position 
can  be  maintained. 

Man,  however,  is  a  social  animal.  A  man  abstracted  from 
society  and  the  various  relationships  which  society  brings 
would  scarcely  be  a  man.  Now  opposition  and  strife  are  mainly 
negative  in  character.  Rivalry  adds  a  great  interest  to  sport. 
But  the  value  of  sport  is  intrinsic.  In  the  best  conception  of 
sport,  both  sides  win.  It  is  otherwise  with  serious  strife.  Here  the 
values  are  external.  And  opposition  means  not  only  an  enor- 


52  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

mous  expenditure  of  additional  energy,  but  the  eventual  defeat 
of  the  purpose  of  one  party  or  the  other,  possibly  of  both  parties. 
If  human  desires  could  be  so  co-ordinated  as  to  be  rendered 
non-contradictory,  the  vast  amount  of  energy  now  spent  in 
opposition  could  be  turned  to  the  immediate  satisfaction  of 
these  desires,  with  a  resulting  decrease  in  the  number  of  fail- 
ures of  realization.  Thus  it  is  each  man's  truest  interest,  not 
only  to  live  in  society,  but  to  live  in  harmony  with  his  neigh- 
bors. 

There  is  enough  material  on  this  planet  to  support,  with  wise 
management,  a  population  much  greater  than  it  now  contains. 
It  is  not  in  the  satisfaction  of  man's  material  needs  that  the 
difficulty  lies,  but  in  the  satisfaction  of  his  ambitions.  The 
reason  why  the  difficulty  has  been  so  acute  is  because  man  has 
generally  selected  for  the  field  of  his  ambitions  the  same  realm 
of  material  things,  limited  in  supply.  Success  in  this  field  means 
opposition  and  defeat  for  others.  For  while  there  is  enough  to 
satisfy  the  needb  of  others,  there  is  not  enough  to  go  around 
when  each  tries  to  see  how  much  he  can  get.  But  the  realm  of 
material  things  is  not  the  noblest  realm  for  the  satisfaction  of 
human  ambition.  It  seems  puny  beside  those  of  science  and 
art.  For  here  one's  opportunities  are  infinite.  Alexander 
might  sigh  for  more  worlds  to  conquer,  but  the  scientist  does 
not  sigh  for  more  truth  to  discover,  nor  the  artist  for  more 
beauty  to  reveal.  And  success  in  these  fields  does  not  mean 
opposition  and  defeat  for  others.  Scientific  discoveries  and 
artistic  triumphs  even  pave  the  way  for  other  scientific  dis- 
coveries and  artistic  triumphs. 

Thus  strife  is  not  only  injurious,  but  unnecessary.  The  true 
interests  of  individuals  do  not  necessitate  conflicts.  But  if 
this  is  so,  why  may  we  not  regard  the  purpose  of  the  state  as 
the  realization  of  the  good  of  all  the  citizens?  This  viewpoint 
was  abandoned  in  a  former  chapter  because  the  good  of  one 
citizen  seemed  to  conflict  with  that  of  another.  But  if  Rousseau 
and  Bosanquet  are  right,  and  if  the  argument  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs  has  been  sound,  these  conflicting  purposes  can  not 
be  the  true  desires  of  the  individuals  in  question,  but  only  their 
apparent  desires;  not  what  they  really  want,  but  merely  what 
they  think  they  want.  The  purpose  of  the  state  may  be  de- 
fined, then,  as  the  securing  of  the  true  good  of  all  of  its  citizens.. 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  53 

And  the  true  welfare  of  the  citizen  can  not  conflict  with  the  true 
welfare  of  the  group. 

But  will  not  special  instances  arise  in  which  individual  in- 
terests will  conflict, — in  which  not  only  the  apparent  interests, 
but  the  real  interests  of  individuals  will  be  at  odds?  I  suppose 
that  there  will  always  be  accidents.  Two  men  on  a  sinking 
ship  with  but  one  life  preserver  between  them  will  experience 
a  real  conflict  of  interests.  There  is  a  remedy,  of  course,  even 
for  situations  such  as  this.  The  remedy  consists  of  measures 
which  will  tend  to  prevent  such  situations.  And  a  great  deal 
may  surely  be  done  in  this  direction.  We  may  not  be  able  to 
prevent  accidents  altogether,  but  if  we  should  be  able  to  reduce 
them  to  mere  sporadic  occurrences,  we  should  be  satisfied. 
Problems  will  be  encountered,  but  they  are  problems  which 
can  be  solved.  The  problem  of  food  supply  is  at  times  very 
acute,  but  it  is  not  insoluble.  The  world  can  be  made  to  pro- 
duce enough  for  all  of  us.  With  improved  methods  of  agricul- 
ture and  improved  methods  of  transportation,  there  is  no  need 
of  famines. 

A  great  many  other  cases  of  conflicting  interests  are  due  to 
antecedent  wrongs.  If  two  men  are  engaged  in  a  bayonet  duel, 
there  may  be  a  real  conflict  of  interests ;  but  if  the  true  interests 
of  the  men  had  been  consulted  in  the  beginning,  there  would 
never  have  been  any  war  at  all. 

It  is  important,  moreover,  to  note  that  this  harmonization  is 
a  harmonization  of  the  real  interests  of  individuals;  not  a  har- 
monization necessarily  of  what  they  think  they  want.  And 
perhaps  the  hardest  task  in  connection  with  this  harmoniza- 
tion will  be  to  turn  the  aspirations  of  individuals  from  their 
apparent  to  their  true  interests.  The  great  problem  is  to  turn 
the  attention  from  material  things  limited  in  supply  to  the  un- 
limited things  of  the  mind.  Our  industrial  troubles  would 
vanish  if  the  people  could  be  brought  to  the  realization  that 
beyond  the  maintenance  of  a  certain  standard  of  living  they  had 
no  interest  in  wealth.  Art,  science,  and  friendship;  these  are 
the  true  values  of  Me.  And  they  are  the  very  values  which 
grow  larger  upon  being  shared. 

Thus,  I  think,  we  may  admit  Bosanquet's  contention  that  the 
true  interest  of  the  individual  is  in  agreement  with  the  true 
interest  of  the  group.  This  agreement  is  possible  because  it  is 


54  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

the  true  interest  of  the  group  to  secure  a  harmonization  of  the 
true  interests  of  its  members,  and  because  it  is  the  true  interest 
of  each  individual  to  live  in  harmony  with  his  fellows.  Strangely 
enough,  Bosanquet  apparent]y  falls  into  an  inconsistency  in 
one  place  in  connection  with  this  point.  On  page  121,  in  a 
foot-note,  he  says,  "If  all  private  individuals  were  enlightened, 
but  selfishly  interested,  there  could  be  no  public  good  will." 
The  point  is  that  if  all  private  individuals  were  enlightened, 
they  would  will  the  general  will.  Bosanquet  is  probably  think- 
ing of  individuals  who  know  the  good,  but  are  carried  away  by 
momentary  caprices.  The  phrase,  "selfishly  interested,"  is 
unfortunate.  In  the  general  will,  the  difference  between  selfish- 
ness and  unselfishness  is  transcended. 

Bosanquet  proceeds  to  work  out  a  further  development  of 
his  doctrine  of  the  state's  unity.  "We  may  note  two  degrees 
of  connection  between  the  members  of  a  whole,  which  we  may 
call  'Association'  and  'Organisation.'"  (p.  156)  "The  term 
'association'  implies  the  intentional  coming  together  of  units 
which  have  been  separate,  and  which  may  become  separate 
again."  (p.  157)  The  state,  evidently,  whatever  may  be  its 
nature,  presents  a  closer  union  than  this.  In  associations  "we 
are  dealing  with  wholly  casual  conjunctions  of  units  naturally 
independent."  (p.  158)  "The  mind  of  a  crowd  has  indeed  been 
taken  as  the  type  of  a  true  social  mind.  But  it  is  really  some- 
thing quite  different.  It  is  merely  the  superficial  connection 
between  unit  and  unit  on  an  extended  and  intensified  scale. 
As  unit  joins  unit  in  the  street,  each  determines  his  immediate 
neighbours,  and  is  determined  by  them  through  the  contagion 
of  excitement,  and  with  reference  to  the  most  passing  ideas  and 
emotions.  .  .  .  The  crowd  may  indeed  '  act  as  one  man ' ;  but 
if  it  does  so,  its  level  of  intelligence  and  responsibility  will,  as 
a  rule,  be  extraordinarily  low.  It  has  nothing  in  common  be- 
yond what  unit  can  infect  unit  with  in  a  moment.  Concerted 
action,  much  more  reasoning  and  criticism,  are  out  of  the 
question.  The  doing  or  thinking  of  a  different  thing  by  each 
unit  with  reference  to  a  single  end  is  impossible.  The  crowd 
moves  as  a  mere  mass,  because  its  parts  are  connected  merely 
as  unit  with  unit."  (p.  160)  "We  have  the  contagious  common 
feeling  of  a  crowd  taken  as  the  true  type  of  a  collective  mind, 
obviously  because  it  is  not  understood  how  an  identical  struc- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  55 

ture  can  include  the  differences,  the  rational  distinctions  and 
relations,  which  really  constitute  the  working  mind  of  any 
society."  (p.  46) 

"An  army,  no  less  than  a  crowd,  consists  of  a  multitude  of 
men,  who  are  associated,  unit  to  unit."  (p.  160)  But  "the 
army  is  a  machine,  or  an  organisation,  which  is  bound  together 
by  operative  ideas  embodied  on  the  one  hand  in  the  officers, 
and  on  the  other  hand  in  the  habit  of  obedience  and  the  trained 
capacity  which  make  every  unit  willing  and  able  to  be  determined 
not  by  the  impulse  of  his  neighbours,  but  by  the  orders  of  his 
officers.  What  the  army  does  is  determined  by  the  general's 
plan,  and  not  by  influences  communicating  themselves  from 
man  to  man,  as  in  a  crowd.  In  other  words,  every  unit  moves 
with  reference  to  the  movements  of  a  great  whole."  (p.  161) 

Bosanquet  now  introduces  his  Appercipient  Mass  theory. 
The  activities  of  a  mob  are  compared  to  the  activity  of  a  mind 
working  through  mere  chance  associations.  But  "in  the  action 
of  every  appercipient  mass,  in  as  far  as  it  determines  thought 
by  the  general  nature  of  a  systematic  whole,  rather  than  through 
the  isolated  attraction  exercised  by  unit  upon  unit,  we  have  an 
example  of  organisation  as  opposed  to  association."  (p.  166) 
"Every  individual  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  thinks  and  acts  in  defi- 
nite schemes  or  contexts,  is  a  structure  of  appercipient  systems 
or  organised  dispositions."  "Every  social  group  or  institu- 
tion involves  a  system  of  appercipient  systems,  by  which  the 
minds  that  take  part  in  it  are  kept  in  correspondence."  (p.  173) 
"The  actual  reality  of  the  school  lies  in  the  fact  that  certain 
living  minds  are  connected  in  a  certain  way."  (p.  171)  "The 
connection,  as  it  is  within  any  one  mind,  is  useless  and  mean- 
ingless if  you  take  it  wholly  apart  from  what  corresponds  to 
it  in  the  others."  "And  it  is  because  of  this  nature  of  the 
elements  which  make  up  the  institution  that  it  is  possible  for 
the  institution  itself  to  be  an  identity,  or  connection,  or  meet- 
ing point,  by  which  many  minds  are  bound  together  in  a  single 
system."  (p.  172) 

It  is  true  that  the  different  appercipient  systems  within  any 
one  mind  are  not  all  co-ordinated.  However,  the  general  na- 
ture of  the  mind  is  to  be  a  unit.  "Thus  each  individual  mind, 
if  we  consider  it  as  a  whole,  is  an  expression  or  reflection  of 
society  as  a  whole  from  a  point  of  view  which  is  distinctive  and 


56  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

unique.  Every  social  factor  or  relation,  to  which  it  in  any  way 
corresponds,  or  in  which  it  in  any  way  plays  its  part,  is  repre- 
sented in  some  feature  of  its  appercipient  organism.  And  prob- 
ably, just  as,  in  any  man's  idea  of  London,  there  is  hardly  any 
factor  of  London  life  which  does  not  at  least  colour  the  back- 
ground, so,  in  every  individual  impression  of  the  social  whole, 
there  is  no  social  feature  that  does  not,  in  one  way  or  another, 
contribute  to  the  total  effect.  In  the  dispositions  of  every 
mind  the  entire  social  structure  is  reflected  in  a  unique  form, 
and  it  is  on  this  reflection  in  every  mind,  and  on  the  uniqueness 
of  the  form  in  which  it  is  reflected,  that  the  working  of  the 
social  whole,  by  means  of  differences  which  play  into  one  another, 
depends."  (p.  174)  The  social  whole  "would  therefore  be  of 
the  nature  of  a  continuous  or  self-identical  being,  pervading  a 
system  of  differences  and  realised  only  in  them.  It  differs 
from  a  machine,  or  from  what  is  called  an  'organism'  pure  and 
simple,  by  the  presence  of  the  whole  in  every  part,  not  merely 
for  the  inference  of  the  observer,  but,  in  some  degree,  for  the 
part  itself,  through  the  action  of  consciousness."  (p.  175) 

It  is  in  this  way  that  Bosanquet  seeks  to  make  more  definite 
his  conception  of  the  state's  unity.  How  far  is  such  a  theory 
necessitated?  It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  entire 
social  structure  is  reflected  in  each  individual  mind.  And 
the  entire  conception  recommends  itself  most  easily  to  those 
accustomed  to  an  Hegelian  way  of  thinking.  I  do  not  believe 
that  it  is  necessary,  if  one  is  to  regard  the  state  as  a  personality, 
that  he  be  forced  to  think  of  it  in  Bosanquet's  fashion  as  a  unity 
in  difference  of  appercipient  systems,  or  as  a  still  more  unin- 
telligible oversoul  of  some  sort  after  the  fashion  of  Professor 
Royce.  These  two  viewpoints  may  be  entirely  acceptable  to 
those  who  are  disposed  to  accept  them.  If  Bosanquet's  theory 
appeals  to  you,  it  will  doubtless  prove  entirely  satisfactory. 
Or,  if  you  are  a  follower  of  Professor  Royce,  you  may  regard 
the  state,  as  all  groups,  as  a  spiritual  unity  of  one  life.  But  the 
state  may  be  regarded  as  a  unity  without  resorting  to  such 
measures.  As  Jellinek  points  out,  what  we  mean  by  a  unity 
commonly  has  its  unity  in  terms  of  purpose.  And  the  state 
may  be  conceived  of  as  a  unity,  because  of  its  unity  of  purpose 
and  will.  (Gesetz  und  Verordnung,  S.  189-205)  Freund,  in  his 
Legal  Nature  of  Corporations,  treats  the  corporation  as  a  col- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  57 

lective  unity  acting  by  means  of  the  principle  of  representation. 
Freund  depreciates  attempts  to  seek  for  an  "  unattainable  meta- 
physical unity."  The  real  unity  of  a  corporation  results  from 
the  psychological  nexus  of  its  members,  from  its  unity  of  action, 
secured  by  means  of  the  principle  of  representation,  and  from 
its  common  purpose.  The  corporation  is  only  a  "  relative 
unity."  But  "just  as  it  is  impossible  to  define  the  meaning  of 
a  physical  thing  as  distinct  from  other  things  otherwise  than 
by  an  act  of  mental  arbitrament,  which  determines  that  there 
is  a  sufficient  connection  between  parts,  either  physical  or  by 
reference  to  some  human  purpose,  to  justify  the  idea  of  unity, 
so  there  is  no  absolute  objective  test  by  which  we  could  be 
forced  to  allow  or  deny  the  character  of  unity  to  an  aggregate 
body  of  human  persons.  The  analogy  of  composite  things 
explains  perfectly  the  nature  of  the  association.  If  we  treat  a 
house,  a  ship,  a  forest,  or  a  mine,  as  one  thing,  we  do  not  deny 
that  this  thing  is  composed  of  many  separate  or  severable  parts, 
each  of  which  may  be  a  thing  by  itself.  But  in  so  far  as  the 
connection  is  operative,  the  part  has  no  legal  existence  except 
as  a  part,  and  does  not  form  an  object  of  separate  legal  disposi- 
tion; it  shares  the  legal  status  of  the  composite  thing,  while 
as  soon  as  the  nexus  is  broken  or  only  disregarded,  it  becomes  a 
subject  of  independent  treatment  in  law."  (p.  77)  The  cor- 
poration may  be  considered  as  a  unit.  "Whether,  under  all 
the  circumstances,  we  shall  call  the  corporation  a  person,  is 
evidently  a  matter  of  discretion. "  (ibid.,  p.  80)  Freund  contends 
that  his  viewpoint  escapes  the  errors  of  both  of  the  extreme  doc- 
trines. If  we  regard  the  corporation  as  a  fiction,  we  are  neg- 
lecting the  "relative  psychological  unity,"  which  is  a  very  real 
factor  in  the  corporation,  and  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  attribute 
to  the  corporation  a  moral  and  legal  responsibility.  The  theory 
of  the  "real  will,"  on  the  other  hand,  "carries  into  the  law  an 
unknown  and  hypothetical  metaphysical  quantity."  (ibid.,  p. 
83) 

A  state  is  one  species  of  a  corporation;  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  we  can  not  translate  the  preceding  passage  from  its  legal 
terminology  into  more  general  language  and  say  that  the  state 
is  a  composite  unity,  a  personal  nexus  unified  by  one  purpose, 
and  acting  as  a  unit  by  the  principle  of  representation.  The 
unity  of  the  state  is  not  a  fiction.  Neither  do  we  have  to  re- 


58  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

gard  the  state  as  an  oversoul,  or  as  a  unity  in  difference  in  ap- 
percipient  masses.  The  true  unity  of  the  state  lies  in  its  em- 
bodiment of  a  general  will,  a  common  purpose,  a  community  of 
interests. 

VIII.  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  A  GENERAL  WILL. 

We  are  nearing  the  end  of  our  rather  lengthy  digression  from 
the  immediate  question  of  patriotism.  The  digression  began 
with  the  query:  Whose  good  is  the  state  to  realize?  The  first 
answer  was:  The  good  of  all  the  citizens.  But  we  noticed  that 
the  interests  of  citizens  seemed  to  conflict.  We  noticed  that 
the  increasing  mass  of  legislation  seemed  to  negate  the  greatest 
good  of  all, — freedom.  And  we  noticed  the  prevalence,  espe- 
cially in  war,  of  serious  self  sacrifice.  But  at  the  same  time  the 
conception  of  man  as  an  end  in  himself  made  us  view  any  de- 
feat of  human  purpose  as  a  misfortune,  more  or  less  serious. 
These  difficulties  made  us  begin  to  think  that  we  were  on  the 
wrong  track.  Perhaps  the  purpose  of  the  state  was  not  to  se- 
cure the  good  of  individuals  at  all.  Possibly  there  was  a  pur- 
pose in  the  state  above  the  purposes  of  its  individual  citizens. 
This  view  suggests  that  the  state  may  possess  a  unified  life  of 
its  own.  How  can  the  state  be  conceived  of  as  a  unity?  The 
organic  theory  was  found  to  be  unsatisfactory.  Not  only  did 
the  analogy  break  down  at  certain  important  points,  but  the 
implications  of  the  theory  were  directly  opposed  to  the  dogmas 
of  modern  democracy.  According  to  these  implications,  dif- 
ferences in  rank  were  to  be  regarded  as  intrinsic  and  beneficial, 
and  the  less  important  members  of  society  were  to  be  freely 
sacrificed  to  the  more  important.  The  theory  furnished  an 
admirable  means  of  justifying  any  injustices  in  the  present 
order.  And  the  perfection  of  a  state  was  supposed  to  be  ac- 
companied by  a  progressive  decline  of  the  freedom  of  its  indi- 
vidual citizens.  So  contrary  to  the  modern  spirit  are  these 
implications  that  the  most  conspicuous  representative  of  th& 
theory,  Herbert  Spencer,  refused  to  draw  them,  after  spending 
153  pages  in  establishing  the  analogy  itself.  Consequently, 
we  turned  to  the  view  that  the  state  is  a  personality.  Whether 
the  state  is  treated  primarily  from  a  legal,  from  a  historical,  or 
from  a  more  strictly  philosophical  point  of  view,  we  found  that 
the  essence  of  this  doctrine  lay  in  attributing  to  the  state  a 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  59 

common  purpose,  and  a  common  will.  This  general  will  is 
defined  as  the  true  interest  of  the  state,  not  necessarily  what  the 
people  think  they  want,  but  what  they  really  want.  And  this 
general  will  is  also  in  harmony  with  the  truer  will  of  each  indi- 
vidual, for  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  human  purposes, 
truly  conceived,  are  not  contradictory.  We  noticed  the  pos- 
sible objection  that  human  purposes  might  conflict  in  special 
instances.  But  with  the  growth  of  science  and  civilization  such 
conflicts  may  be  reduced  to  a  negligible  factor  in  society.  There 
may  always  remain  sporadic  instances  of  unavoidable  conflict, 
but  they  will  be  mere  accidents.  Many  of  the  conflicts  which 
occur  at  the  present  time  are  due  to  some  antecedent  wrong. 
Another  great  source  of  conflict  arises  from  the  emphasis  upon 
material  things  instead  of  the  values  of  art,  science,  and  friend- 
ship, which  are  not  reduced  by  sharing. 

But  are  we  not  back  at  our  starting  point?  We  are  again 
conceiving  of  the  purpose  of  the  state  as  the  realization  of  the 
good  of  all  its  citizens.  It  is  true  that  we  are  back  in  a  sense 
at  our  starting  place,  but  on  a  higher  plane.  We  deserted  our 
initial  position  because  the  welfare  of  one  citizen  seemed  to 
conflict  with  that  of  another.  But  our  difficulties  arose  from  the 
fact  that  we  were  dealing,  not  with  the  true  welfare  of  the 
citizens,  but  with  merely  what  they  think  they  want.  Be- 
tween apparent  interests,  endless  conflicts  may  arise.  But  be- 
tween true  interests,  as  we  have  just  seen,  we  may  hope  to  secure 
a  harmony.  And  the  goal  of  our  endeavors  should  be  such  a 
harmonization  of  real  interests  rather  than  a  mere  compromise 
of  apparent  interests.  A  compromise  disappoints  both  parties, 
and  if  it  regards  only  apparent  interests,  does  not  give  the 
individuals  what  they  want  after  all.  The  function  of  the 
state  is  not  to  seek  to  find  compromises,  but  to  seek  to  satisfy 
completely  the  real  wills  of  both  parties  to  the  conflict.  (See 
Professor  Singer's  article,  Love  and  Loyalty,  in  the  Philosophical 
Review  for  1916.) 

The  present  viewpoint  also  enables  us  to  solve  the  problem  of 
the  apparent  decrease  of  freedom  through  legislation.  If  the 
legislation  is  wise,  and  if  it  embodies  the  general  will,  the  in- 
dividual actually  realizes  his  freedom  through  restrictions. 
The  laws  only  compel  him  to  do  what  he  really  wants  to  do, 
if  he  could  but  think  clearly.  How  are  we  to  know  that  legisla- 


60  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

tion  will  be  of  this  character?  We  can  not  know.  We  can 
only  hope  that  with  the  growth  of  political  art  and  science,  legis- 
lation will  come  to  approach  such  a  limit.  And  although  I  do 
not  share  Rousseau's  optimism  that  under  normal  conditions 
the  true  general  will  will  always  become  manifested  through  a 
poll  of  the  citizens,  yet  it  is  a  characteristic  fact  that  public 
opinion  will  ultimately  uphold  the  wiser  course  of  action. 

The  absurdities  of  extreme  individualism  are  becoming  more 
and  more  apparent  to  the  present  day  political  consciousness. 
To  certain  English  thinkers  of  about  a  century  ago,  government 
appeared  as  an  external  restraint  upon  the  individual.  Ben- 
tham  describes  law  as  a  necessary  evil,  and  government  as  a 
choice  of  evils.  But  such  thinkers  admit  with  one  voice  that 
a  certain  minimum  of  government  is  necessary  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  sentient  or  rational  self.  It  would  thus  appear  that 
liberty  is  increased  by  curtailing  some  portion  of  it.  Liberty, 
consequently,  can  not  be  a  homogeneous  thing,  but  must  be 
something  of  a  complex  nature  like  a  living  plant,  which  thrives 
best  under  certain  limitations.  But  if  this  is  so,  law  can  not 
be  antagonistic  to  liberty.  (Bosanquet,  Philosophical  Theory 
oj  the  State,  pp.  56-58) 

Herbert  Spencer  was  greatly  alarmed  by  the  growing  tendency 
towards  a  centralized  government,  which  he  attributed  to  the 
growing  militarism  accompanying  England's  frequent  wars  in 
the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  As  evidences  of  this 
" militarism"  he  cites:  The  contagious  diseases  acts,  which 
override  those  guarantees  of  individual  freedom  provided  by 
constitutional  forms.  He  objects  also  to  sanitary  dictation 
on  the  part  of  the  government.  He  notices  with  alarm  that 
"in  sundry  towns  municipal  bodies  have  become  distributors 
of  gas  and  water."  (op.  cit.,  p.  583)  "Men  are  to  be  made 
temperate  by  impediments  to  drinking — shall  be  less  free  than 
hitherto  to  buy  and  sell  certain  articles."  "Not  by  quick  and 
certain  penalty  for  breach  of  contract  is  adulteration  to  be 
remedied,  but  by  public  analyzers."  "Without  regard  to 
their  deserts,  men  shall  be  provided  at  the  public  cost  with  free 
libraries,  free  local  museums,  etc.;  and  from  the  savings  of  the 
more  worthy  shall  be  taken  by  the  tax-gatherer  means  of  supply- 
ing the  less  worthy  who  have  not  saved."  (ibid.,  p.  584)  "The 
compulsion  once  supposed  to  be  justified  in  religious  instruc- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  61 

tion  by  the  infallible  judgment  of  a  Pope,  is  now  supposed  to 
be  justified  in  secular  instruction  by  the  infallible  judgment  of 
a  Parliament;  and  thus,  under  penalty  of  imprisonment  for 
resistance,  there  is  established  an  education  bad  in  matter,  bad 
in  manner,  bad  in  order."  (ibid.,  p.  585) 

And  so  this  is  the  essence  of  militarism,  is  it?  Public  health 
regulations,  government  ownership  of  certain  public  utilities r 
control  of  intemperance  by  legislation,  pure  food  laws,  public 
libraries,  museums,  and  mirabile  dictu,  a  public  school  system! 
This  is  individualism  with  a  vengeance,  indeed.  The  truth 
which  Spencer  was  unable  to  recognize  is  that  such  laws  may 
embody  better  than  the  individual's  own  momentary  opinion, 
his  real  interest  and  his  real  desire.  The  doctrine  of  the  general 
will  allows  us  to  retain  a  theory  of  freedom  which  does  not 
involve  anarchy. 

The  third  and  most  serious  difficulty  which  arose  upon  our 
first  attempt  to  conceive  of  the  purpose  of  the  state  as  the 
realization  of  the  good  of  all  its  citizens  was  the  necessity  of 
the  supreme  self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of  certain  citizens  for  the 
good  of  the  state.  This  supreme  self-sacrifice  occurs  most 
frequently  in  war.  It  may  not  perhaps  be  possible  to  eliminate 
such  sacrifice  altogether  in  the  case  of  firemen,  policemen, 
etc.;  but  if  war  could  be  made  unnecessary,  such  sacrifices 
could  at  least  be  reduced  to  the  category  of  mere  accidents. 
Now  war  is  concerned  almost  exclusively  with  independent 
states.  As  civilization  advances,  internal  rebellion  becomes 
less  frequent.  The  causes  of  such  rebellions  may  be  attributed 
to  short-sightedness  on  the  part  of  individuals  together  with  a 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  realize  the  true  general  wilL 
And  we  may  hope  that  with  the  growth  of  the  idea  of  co-opera- 
tion, civil  wars  will  greatly  decrease  in  frequency.  But  wars 
most  frequently  arise  between  independent  governments.  If 
there  were  no  independent  governments  on  the  earth,  war 
would  be,  practically  speaking,  a  thing  of  the  past.  If  mankind 
were  organized  into  a  world  state  constructed  so  as  to  embody 
the  true  general  will  of  the  earth's  inhabitants,  all  of  our  pre- 
vious difficulties  would  approach  their  vanishing  point. 

The  advantages  of  co-operation  over  opposition  have  already 
been  pointed  out.  In  co-operation,  each  man  secures  his  own 
truest  desire.  Where  there  is  no  co-operation,  there  results  an 


62  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

inevitable  defeat  of  human  purposes  through  friction.  Added 
to  this  disadvantage  is  the  enormous  amount  of  additional 
energy  necessitated,  not  by  the  primary  endeavor,  but  by  the 
fact  of  the  opposition  itself.  With  how  large  a  group  should  a 
man  co-operate?  Obviously,  with  all  those  with  whom  he  has 
dealings.  In  former  times,  social  groups  were  extremely  small. 
Even  the  Greeks  could  speak,  although  not  very  accurately,  of 
their  ideal  city  state  of  perhaps  20,000  inhabitants  as  a  commun- 
ity sufficient  unto  itself.  (The  state  discussed  in  Plato's  Laws 
was  to  consist  of  5040  households.)  But  in  modern  times  the 
group  with  which  one  has  dealings  has  been  constantly  enlarged. 
With  the  growth  of  the  facilities  for  transportation,  and  the 
consequent  growth  of  trade,  the  entire  globe  is  becoming  more 
and  more  one  community. 

Now  in  this  world  community,  as  in  any  community,  there  is 
great  danger  that  conflicts  may  arise  between  the  subordinate 
groups.  Each  social  unit,  whether  a  single  person,  a  group  of 
persons,  or  a  state,  is  always  liable,  because  of  the  narrowness 
of  its  viewpoint,  to  the  error  of  emphasizing  its  own  apparent 
particular  will  at  the  expense  of  the  general  will,  although  its 
own  truest  welfare  is  ultimately  to  be  found  in  just  such  a  condi- 
tion of  general  co-operation.  Consequently,  there  must  be 
some  machinery  established  to  act  as  a  harmonizing  agency  and 
to  maintain  the  general  will.  Bosanquet  strongly  emphasizes 
the  need  of  regulation  by  the  state  of  subordinate  groups  within 
it.  "It  is  plain  that  unless,  on  the  whole,  a  working  harmony 
were  maintained  between  the  different  groups  which  form 
society,  life  could  not  go  on.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
State,  as  the  widest  grouping  whose  members  are  effectively 
united  by  a  common  experience,  is  necessarily  the  one  com- 
munity which  has  absolute  power  to  ensure,  by  force,  if  need 
be,  at  least  sufficient  adjustment  of  the  claims  of  all  other 
groupings  to  make  life  possible.  Assuming,  indeed,  that  all 
the  groupings  are  organs  of  a  single  pervading  life,  we  find  it 
incredible  that  there  should  ultimately  be  irreconcilable  opposi- 
tion between  them.  That  they  should  contradict  one  another 
is  not  more  nor  less  possible  than  that  human  nature  should 
be  at  variance  with  itself."  (The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the 
State,  p.  169) 

Rousseau  had  so  keen  a  sense  of  the  danger  which  might 
result  from  subordinate  groups  in  the  state  that  he  found  ob- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  63 

jection  to  the  existence  of  political  parties.  When  the  people 
"divide  into  factions  and  partial  associations  at  the  expense  of 
the  whole,  the  will  of  each  of  these  associations  becomes  general 
with  regard  to  its  members,  and  individual  with  regard  to  the 
state."  (op.  cit.,  II,  3)  And  there  is  great  danger  that  the  true 
general  will  of  the  state  will  be  subordinated  to  the  particular 
will  of  a  powerful  faction.  Rousseau's  objection  to  political 
parties  may  be  questioned,  but  he  clearly  recognized  the  tend- 
ency of  a  partial  association  to  form  a  will  general  with  respect 
to  itself,  but  special  with  respect  to  the  community  at  large. 
If  our  preceding  analysis  has  been  correct,  the  welfare  which  is 
common  to  the  community  at  large  is  the  truest  welfare  of  every 
individual  in  the  community  and  of  every  subordinate  group. 
Thus  the  apparent  will  of  a  partial  association  is  not  the  true 
will  even  of  that  group. 

Now  it  is  the  besetting  sin  of  the  nationalistic  members  of 
the  world  community  that  each  strives  to  realize  a  will  parti- 
cular to  itself  instead  of  the  true  general  will  of  humanity  as  a 
whole.  But  our  logic  pushes  us  on  to  assert  that  the  true 
interest  of  any  state  is  not  to  be  found  in  its  own  particular 
will,  but  rather  in  the  general  will  of  the  world  community. 
Consequently,  there  must  be  a  world  government  to  maintain 
such  a  general  will,  and  to  enforce  a  harmonious  co-operation 
between  nations. 

It  is  the  essential  function  of  government  to  maintain  this 
condition  of  co-operation  as  opposed  to  the  self-regarding  im- 
pulses of  individuals  and  subordinate  groups.  This  function 
is  the  rationale  of  the  state's  existence.  And  since  each  sub- 
ordinate unit  finds  the  fulfilment  of  its  own  truest  will  in  such 
a  state  of  co-operation,  in  a  condition  in  which  it  may  realize 
its  highest  self  freed  from  the  burden  of  opposition  and  social 
friction,  the  state  is  the  very  guarantee  of  freedom.  The 
larger  the  state,  the  more  people  with  whom  we  co-operate, 
and  the  less  friction.  Thus  where  there  is  widespread  human 
intercourse,  we  may  say,  in  opposition  to  Rousseau,  that  the 
larger  the  state  is,  the  more  liberty  there  is.  But  perfect 
liberty  will  be  attained  only  when  all  opposition  has  been  tran- 
scended. And  this  condition  can  come  about  only  when  all 
social  units  capable  of  opposing  one  another  are  brought  under 
the  same  harmonizing  agency,  that  is,  when  there  is  a  world 


64  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

state.  Wars  arise,  not  because  the  community  of  interests 
stops  at  the  frontiers,  but  because  there  is  no  world  state  with 
authority  to  ascertain  and  enforce  this  common  welfare. 

Bosanquet  has  insisted  so  strongly  upon  the  regulation  by 
the  state  of  subordinate  groups  within  it,  that  we  naturally 
expect  him  to  extend  the  principle  to  the  international  sphere. 
Recent  history  has  shown  the  great  need  for  such  a  regulation 
of  states  by  a  world  government.  But  that  the  true  interests 
of  states  "should  contradict  one  another  is  not  more  nor  less 
possible  than  that  human  nature  should  be  at  variance  with 
itself."  Contrary  to  expectation,  Bosanquet  refuses  to  take 
the  step.  A  world  state  is  a  conception  beyond  the  reach  of 
his  political  faith. 

Bosanquet  first  emphasizes  the  great  diversity  in  the  civili- 
zations existing  upon  the  world  today.  "According  to  the 
current  ideas  of  our  civilisation,  a  great  part  of  the  lives  which 
are  being  lived  and  have  been  lived  by  mankind  are  not  lives 
worth  living,  in  the  sense  of  embodying  qualities  for  which  life 
seems  valuable  to  us."  (Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State,  p. 
328)  "Every  people,  as  a  rule,  seems  to  find  contentment  in 
its  own  type  of  life.  This  cannot  contradict,  for  us,  the  im- 
perativeness of  our  own  sense  of  the  best.  But  it  may  make  us 
cautious  as  to  the  general  theory  of  progress,  and  ready  to  admit 
that  one  type  of  humanity  cannot  cover  the  whole  ground  of 
the  possibilities  of  human  nature."  (ibid.,  p.  332)  "There  is 
no  organism  of  humanity.  For  such  an  organism,  conscious- 
ness of  connection  is  necessary."  (Social  and  International 
Ideals,  abbreviated  S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  291)  "No  such  identical  ex- 
perience can  be  presupposed  in  all  mankind  as  is  necessary  to 
effective  membership  of  a  common  society  and  exercise  of  a 
general  will."  (Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State,  p.  329)  Any 
government  which  is  not  supported  by  a  common  culture  is 
dangerous.  "Behind  all  force  there  must  be  a  general  will, 
and  the  general  will  must  represent  a  communal  mind."  (S.  & 
I.  I.,  p.  271)  "The  body  which  is  to  be  in  sole  or  supreme 
command  of  force  for  the  common  good  must  possess  a  true 
general  will,  and  for  that  reason  must  be  a  genuine  community 
sharing  a  common  sentiment  and  animated  by  a  common  tradi- 
tion."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  292)  In  so  far  as  a  common  culture  is  not 
realized,  "any  unitary  authority  which  it  may  be  attempted  to- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  65 

set  up  will  be  superficial,  external,  arbitrary,  and  liable  to  dis- 
ruption." (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  294) 

Bosanquet's  plan  is  that  each  group  must  recognize  the  rights 
of  humanity  in  other  peoples  without  the  assistance  of  a  com- 
mon government.  Just  as  it  is  incomparably  better,  according 
to  Bosanquet,  for  the  separate  languages  to  continue  in  exist- 
ence, provided  there  is  a  widespread  study  of  foreign  languages, 
than  it  would  be  to  have  a  universal  tongue;  so  it  is  incompar- 
ably better  to  have  different  states  recognizing  one  another's 
rights,  than  to  have  one  world  government.  "The  respect  of 
States  and  individuals  for  humanity  is  then,  after  all,  in  its 
essence,  a  duty  to  maintain  a  type  of  life,  not  general,  but  the 
best  we  know,  which  we  call  the  most  human,  and  in  accordance 
with  it  to  recognise  and  deal  with  the  rights  of  alien  individuals 
and  communities.  This  conception  is  opposed  to  the  treatment 
of  all  individual  human  beings  as  members  of  an  identical  com- 
munity having  identical  capacities  and  rights.  It  follows  our 
general  conviction  that  not  numbers  but  qualities  determine  the 
value  of  life. "  (Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State,  p.  331)  "Those 
who  think  federation  necessary  for  the  sake  of  a  central  force, 
obviously  believe  in  force  rather  than  in  friendship.  But  with- 
out friendship  the  force  is  dangerous,  and  with  it,  perhaps, 
hardly  necessary."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  297) 

Bosanquet  seems  to  think  that  with  proper  internal  policies, 
international  troubles  will  disappear.  He  asks:  "Is  it  in  the 
nature  of  states  that  differences  should  constantly  be  arising 
between  them?"  "To  organize  good  life  in  a  certain  territory 
seems  to  have  nothing  in  it  prima  facie  which  should  necessitate 
variance  between  the  bodies  charged  with  the  task  in  one  place 
and  in  another."  (Patriotism  in  the  Perfect  State,  an  article 
contributed  to  The  International  Crisis,  p.  144)  "The  cause 
of  external  conflict  as  a  rule  is  not  internal  organization,  but 
internal  disorganization."  "People  who  are  satisfied  do  not 
want  to  make  war;  and  in  a  well-organized  community  people 
are  satisfied.  War  must  arise  from  dissatisfied  elements  in  a 
community;  people  who  have  not  got  what  they  want  within 
(or  have  it  but  are  afraid  of  losing  it)  and  so  look  for  profit  or 
for  security  in  adventures  without."  (ibid.,  p.  145)  As  ele- 
ments of  trouble  in  a  state  Bosanquet  mentions  privileged 
classes,  oppressed  religious  persuasions,  and  oppressed  national- 


66  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

ities.  Then  there  is  "the  whole  set  of  restrictions  upon  human 
intercourse  which  depend  on  the  idea  that  the  gain  of  one  com- 
munity is  the  loss  of  another.  All  of  these  make  doubly  for 
war;  they  make  privileges  at  home,  which  turn  the  mind  of 
the  privileged  class  away  from  internal  organization  and  to- 
wards external  aggression;  and  they  make  exclusions  abroad, 
turning  the  mind  of  the  excluded  classes  to  retaliation  both  in 
kind  and  by  arms."  (ibid.,  p.  146)  According  to  Bosanquet, 
we  may  expect  peace  when  the  state  turns  its  attention  to  har- 
monious internal  organization,  excluding  privilege  and  mon- 
opoly; and  when  the  attention  of  the  citizens  is  turned  to  those 
supreme  goods  which  are  not  diminished  by  sharing,  such  as 
kindness,  beauty,  truth,  (ibid.,  p.  150,  S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  12)  We 
welcome  "the  co-operation  and  even  the  competition  of  other 
nations  in  the  sphere  of  truth  and  beauty  and  social  improve- 
ment; and  having  adopted  this  attitude  in  respect  of  the  things 
which  we  value  most  highly,  we  are  not  disposed  to  be  jealous 
and  suspicious  about  other  kinds  of  success."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  pp. 
13-14)  "  A  system  of  nation-states  or  of  commonwealths  .  .  . 
each  internally  well  organised,  would  not  perhaps  give  us  all 
that  a  world-state  might  give  us."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  295)  "But 
there  is  no  reason  in  principle  why  a  system  of  states,  each 
doing  with  fair  completeness  its  local  work  of  organisation,  and 
recognising,  with  or  without  active  modification,  the  world- 
wide relations  which  pass  through  them,  should  not  result  in  a 
world  as  peaceful  as  one  under  a  more  unitary  system,  and  much 
richer  in  quality."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  296) 

The  peculiarity  in  Bosanquet's  position  is  this.  He  seems  to 
think  that  states  may  reach  a  certain  stage  of  moral  develop- 
ment at  which,  without  any  international  governmental  ma- 
chinery, they  may  harmonize  with  one  another  as  co-operating 
units.  But  he  does  not  believe  that  they  will  be  able  to  har- 
monize with  the  assistance  of  this  machinery.  Bosanquet, 
however,  would  not  think  of  applying  the  same  principles 
within  the  state.  Let  us  consider  certain  groups  subordinate 
to  the  state.  Different  groups  may  be  composed  of  persons  of 
different  dispositions,  different  purposes,  different  modes  of 
living,  very  likely  of  different  faiths,  and  possibly  of  different 
nationalities,  speaking  different  languages.  Why  do  we  not 
say  that  although  these  groups  might  reach  such  a  stage  of 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  67 

moral  development  that  they  could  harmonize  without  the  aid 
of  governmental  machinery,  yet  they  could  never  endure  to 
exist  with  one  another  under  the  same  government?  Does 
Bosanquet  say  anything  like  this?  Far  from  it.  We  have  only 
to  turn  back  to  the  passage  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  state  as 
the  agency  which  is  to  secure  the  harmonization  of  subordinate 
groups,  by  force  if  need  be. 

Bosanquet's  difficulties  with  the  concept  of  internationalism 
arise,  I  think,  from  the  too  wide  significance  which  he  gives  to 
the  idea  of  the  general  will.  By  a  great  many  writers  on  the 
subject  of  internationalism  the  term,  general  will,  is  used  in 
two  very  different  senses.  The  first  sense  is  that  of  the  general 
will  proper,  the  practical  realization  on  the  part  of  each  citizen 
that  human  desires,  truly  conceived,  are  non-contradictory,  and 
that  man  finds  his  truest  welfare  in  co-operation  with  his  fellows. 
This  community  of  interests  exists  beyond  the  state  as  well  as 
within  it.  The  second  sense  is  that  of  a  common  culture  which 
is  also  a  peculiar  culture, — that  which  makes  the  state  a  unique 
something.  We  hear  much  about  a  common  ancestry,  a  com- 
mon tradition,  a  common  language,  common  views  of  life  and 
modes  of  living,  in  fact,  a  common  civilization.  In  this  respect 
different  states  may  differ  radically.  According  to  the  first 
conception,  it  is  necessary  for  a  general  will  that  human  desires 
be  non-contradictory;  according  to  the  second,  they  must  be 
in  large  measure  identical.  Bosanquet's  attack  upon  inter- 
nationalism is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  a  state  can  be 
founded  only  upon  a  common  culture. 

This  assumption  is  greatly  to  be  questioned.  The  most 
conspicuous  case  in  point  is  Switzerland.  Here  we  have  three 
nationalities  and  three  languages,  along  with  religious  differ- 
ences. Instances  in  which  such  differences  have  led  to  trouble 
have  been,  I  believe,  invariably  instances  in  which  there  has 
been  oppression, — instances  in  which  the  community  of  interests 
has  been  deliberately  violated. 

A  common  culture  among  the  citizens  of  a  state  is  not,  thenr 
a  sine  qua  non.  The  very  expression,  common  culture,  is  rela- 
tive. Among  persons  living  in  such  a  common  culture  there 
are  always  individual  differences,  more  or  less  marked.  It  is 
not  logically  correct  to  say  that  the  true  will  of  every  individual 
is  identical  with  the  general  will.  For  this  would  mean  that  the 


68  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

true  will  of  each  citizen  was  identical  with  the  true  will  of  every 
other  citizen.  But  my  true  will  may  include  a  desire  for  music 
lessons;  yours  may  include  a  desire  to  breed  fine  hogs.  Neither 
of  these  desires  can  be  included  within  the  general  will  of  any 
considerable  community.  There  may  be  some  common  de- 
sires, such  as  the  desire  to  maintain  a  certain  kind  of  education. 
But  the  general  will  is  essentially  the  desire  to  maintain  a  sys- 
tem of  co-operation  in  which  each  may  fulfil  his  higher  self 
without  friction.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  particular 
aspirations  of  individuals,  in  so  far  as  these  are  elements  of 
their  true  wills,  are  non-contradictory.  And  in  small  com- 
munities there  may  be  a  great  many  elements  of  these  indivi- 
dual wills  which  are  common  to  all.  Thus  the  government  of 
a  small  number  of  persons  may  undertake  enterprises  of  com- 
mon interest  which  would  be  impossible  to  the  government  of  a 
greater  number  of  persons.  Nobody  objects  particularly  to 
the  fact  that  Massachusetts  had  in  colonial  times  an  established 
church.  Yet  such  an  establishment  would  be  an  impossibility 
in  the  United  States  today.  As  the  number  of  citizens  increases,  • 
the  number  of  such  common  elements  decreases.  And  the  essen- 
tial core  of  the  general  will  is  always  a  desire  to  maintain  a 
condition  of  co-operation.  Bosanquet  has  suggested  that  the 
state  is  a  unity  in  difference.  And  we  too  may  regard  the  state 
as  a  unity  in  difference,  not  necessarily  in  the  Hegelian  sense  as  a 
social  structure  reflected  as  a  whole  although  uniquely  in  every 
citizen,  but  as  a  common  desire  for  co-operation  and  harmony 
among  a  mass  of  particular  aspirations  which  make  every  in- 
dividual unique. 

Is  it  possible  that  Bosanquet's  troubles  with  the  problem  of 
internationalism  arise  because  he  does  not  see  how  a  universal 
can  be  realized  in  differences?  What  is  essential  to  a  world 
state  is  not  a  common  language,  ancestry,  culture,  etc.,  but  a 
consciousness  of  the  community  of  interests.  And  this  con- 
sciousness is  unusually  strong  in  the  world  at  the  present  time. 
The  entire  project  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  but  a  concrete 
manifestation  of  the  feeling  among  men  that  their  true  interest 
lies  in  the  path  of  harmony  rather  than  strife. 

Bosanquet  seems  in  places  to  have  the  fear  that  different  cul- 
tures will  necessarily  conflict.  He  characterizes  the  alternative 
between  "the  self-defence  of  a  highly  civilised  state  and  sub- 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  69 

mission  in  the  interests  of  the  whole  world's  peace,  a  really 
tragic  crisis."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  pp.  291-292)  But  the  true  interests 
of  a  highly  civilized  state  can  not  be  opposed  to  those  of  the 
world  at  large, — unless,  indeed,  human  nature  should  be  at 
variance  with  itself.  War  can  arise  only  from  a  failure  to  ap- 
prehend the  true  general  will.  In  cases  of  such  failures,  the 
question  whether  or  not  the  principles  at  issue  are  such  as  to 
justify  the  horrors  of  war,  indeed,  always  represents  a  tragic  crisis. 

He  also  asks  "  whether  the  identification  of  spirit  and  experi- 
ence necessary  as  the  basis  of  a  general  will  could  be  achieved 
without  the  sacrifice  of  the  valuable  individual  qualities  of 
national  minds. "  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  298)  But  there  is  no  reason  why 
we  may  not  have  a  general  will  and  keep  these  valuable  indivi- 
dual qualities  of  national  minds.  There  is  nothing  intrinsic 
in  different  national  cultures  to  make  them  conflict  with  one 
another.  Bosanquet  himself  advances  the  idea  that  different 
nations  may  live  in  harmony  with  one  another  while  remaining 
entirely  separate  governments.  The  general  will  necessary  to 
the  world  state  does  not  consist  in  a  common  culture,  but  in  a 
consciousness  that  each  nation  achieves  its  own  truest  interests 
not  through  strife  but  through  harmony, — in  a  consciousness  of 
the  community  of  interests.  The  international  ideal  does  not 
necessitate  the  destruction  of  national  differences.  As  Bradley 
says,  the  life  of  an  organized  world  community  "would  be 
different  in  each  body,  a  harmony,  not  a  monotone."  (A.  C. 
Bradley,  International  Morality:  The  United  States  of  Europe, 
an  article  contributed  to  The  International  Crisis,  p.  58) 

A  world  state,  however,  will  necessarily  include  Africans  and 
Orientals.  The  inhabitants  of  Switzerland  are  at  least  all 
Europeans.  A  federation  of  Europe  may  be  possible,  but  will 
not  the  great  diversity  between  occidental  and  oriental  civili- 
zations cause  a  great  amount  of  trouble?  This  is  a  very  serious 
difficulty  for  any  advocate  of  Internationalism.  However, 
there  has  in  the  last  century  grown  up  a  situation  which  greatly 
reduces  the  difficulty.  The  situation  is  that  at  the  present 
time  most  of  the  world  is  under  European  influence.  Japan, 
the  most  important  Oriental  power,  has  become  greatly  Eur- 
opeanized.  Thus  the  world  state  must  be  a  state  in  which  the 
predominant  influence  will  be  European.  I  do  not  say  that 
this  situation  of  inequality  is  ideal.  But  it  is  simply  unavoid- 


70  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

able.  Our  question  is  not  concerned  with  the  fact  of  whether 
or  not  the  world  is  to  be  dominated  by  peoples  of  European 
descent.  This  seems,  at  least  for  a  period,  inevitable.  The 
question  is  whether  the  world  is  to  be  one  state  under  European 
leadership,  or  is  to  be  dominated  by  a  number  of  different 
European  states. 

But  although  the  fact  of  European  leadership  may  render  the 
establishment  of  a  world  state  less  difficult,  yet  the  situation 
must  be  regarded  as  temporary.  As  Bosanquet  suggests,  we 
have  no  way  of  knowing  which  of  the  divergent  types  of  culture 
existing  on  the  globe  today  is  the  superior  one.  The  correct 
principle  must  be,  consequently,  to  leave  each  culture  free  play 
to  assert  itself  in  its  own  local  environment.  Every  care  must 
be  taken  not  to  try  to  force  upon  an  Oriental  country  a  European 
culture, — in  the  shape  of  language,  science,  art,  or  religion. 
This  does  not  mean  that  different  countries  should  not  be  free 
to  borrow  what  they  desire  of  one  another's  cultures.  There  is  a 
great  difference  between  borrowing  a  culture  and  having  it 
thrust  upon  you.  This  remark  applies  especially  to  religion. 
Bosanquet  even  goes  to  the  extent  of  saying  that  "the  best 
Churchmen  will  admit,  I  believe,  that  to  a  great  extent  at 
least  the  peoples  of  the  world  have  already  the  religions  that 
suit  them  best."  (S.  &  I.  I.,  p.  300) 

The  world  government  must  necessarily  be  a  federated  govern- 
ment. Each  different  nationality  would  be  free  to  work  out 
its  peculiar  civilization.  The  world  government  would  have 
just  sufficient  power  to  enable  it  to  protect  general  interests, 
and  to  keep  its  component  parts  from  continuing  in  discord. 
It  would  be  in  fact  a  harmonizing  agency.  The  distinction 
between  national  and  international  powers  would  be  a  difficult 
matter,  and  possibly  ultimately  an  arbitrary  matter.  Bosan- 
quet presents  a  very  penetrating  criticism  of  Mill's  attempt  to 
delimit  the  analogous  spheres  of  the  national  government  and 
the  individual  citizen.  Bosanquet  insists  that  there  can  not 
be  a  clear  distinction  between  purely  private  interests  and 
public  interests.  He  consequently  defines  the  limit  of  the 
state's  sphere  of  action  to  be  what  the  state  can  do  and  can  not 
do  to  promote  the  best  life.  And  he  is  very  careful  to  point 
out  the  danger  of  trying  to  achieve  this  best  life  by  means  of 
force.  The  chief  purpose  of  the  state  is  to  maintain  a  social 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  71 

order  in  which  the  individual  may  be  able  to  achieve  his  own 
self-development.  The  distinction  of  international  from  na- 
tional powers  must  similarly  be  based  upon  what  the  interna- 
tional government  can  and  can  not  do  to  promote  the  best  life 
of  the  world's  inhabitants.  And  we  must  here  again  note  the 
danger  of  trying  to  force  a  nation  into  what  is  conceived  to  be 
its  best  good. 

The  international  government  must  concern  itself  with  matters 
of  general  interest  only.  The  number  of  desires  common  to  a 
group  of  persons  decreases  as  the  number  in  the  group  increases. 
And  the  desires  common  to  the  entire  globe  would  be  relatively 
few.  We  have  in  the  United  States  a  fairly  standardized  sys- 
tem of  education  maintained  by  law.  But  it  is  not  the  kind  of 
education  which  the  Brahman  would  choose  for  his  son.  Penn- 
sylvania has  a  Sunday  blue  law.  This  would  hardly  commend 
itself  to  Japan.  Even  our  insistence  upon  monogamy  would 
find  little  support  in  Turkey.  The  international  government 
must  keep  itself  well  above  such  matters.  The  different  mem- 
bers of  the  world  state  do  not  have  to  be  all  alike.  When  Bos- 
anquet  states  that  "many  people  are  very  good  friends  apart 
who  would  quarrel  if  they  kept  house  together,"  he  may  be 
reminded  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  different  nations  to 
keep  house  together,  but  merely  to  form  an  orderly  community 
of  households.  (S.  &  I.  L,  p.  298)  The  international  govern- 
ment must  primarily  concern  itself  with  the  prevention  of 
friction  between  nations,  and  the  maintenance  of  a  social  order 
in  which  each  different  form  of  culture  may  achieve  its  own 
self-development. 

There  is  another  objection  to  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
national government.  Such  a  government  can  exist  only  in 
case  there  is  a  very  general  recognition  of  the  community  of 
interests  among  men.  And  if  this  consciousness  of  the  com- 
munity of  interests  develops  sufficiently,  will  there  be  any  need 
of  government  at  all,  national  or  international?  If  each  man 
realizes  that  it  is  his  truest  interest  to  harmonize  with  his  fel- 
lows, why  will  he  have  to  be  forced  to  harmonize?  The  develop- 
ment of  the  consciousness  of  such  a  community  of  interests 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  a  world  state  will,  however,  be 
attained  long  before  the  stage  will  be  reached  where  govern- 
ment may  be  dispensed  with  altogether.  It  is  exceedingly 


72  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

doubtful  whether  such  a  stage  will  ever  be  reached.  The  con- 
ception involves  a  dangerously  lofty  view  of  human  perfecti- 
bility. There  is  also  a  growing  tendency  toward  government 
ownership,  not  only  of  schools  and  post-offices,  but  of  numerous 
other  public  utilities.  Many  of  these  utilities  are  best  managed, 
of  course,  by  local  governments.  In  addition  to  this  tendency 
is  the  fact  that  the  growing  complexity  of  modern  life  is  more 
and  more  necessitating  the  formulation  of  additional  rules 
whereby  citizens  may  get  along  together  without  friction.  Take 
the  matter  of  the  traffic  rules  which  have  been  put  in  force 
especially  since  the  advent  of  the  automobile.  Many  of  the 
rules  are  purely  arbitrary, — for  instance,  the  rule  of  turning  to 
the  right  when  two  vehicles  pass.  There  is  no  particular  reason 
why  this  should  be  done  one  way  rather  than  another,  but 
there  is  a  great  reason  why  everyone  should  do  it  in  the  same 
way.  Thus  the  value  of  the  law,  which  defines  the  conven- 
tion, and  enforces  it.  The  rules  become  in  a  sense  a  standard 
of  ethics.  The  complex  relations  of  modern  business  are  es- 
pecially in  need  of  them. 

These  two  tendencies  indicate  that  we  are  to  see  an  extension 
rather  than  a  restriction  of  the  sphere  of  government.  The 
function  of  a  world  state  would  consist  possibly  not  so  much 
in  the  ownership  of  public  utilities,  but  in  defining  and  main- 
taining a  standard  of  international  relations.  International 
trouble  occurs  not  because  there  is  an  unavoidable  conflict  be- 
tween two  nations.  It  occurs  in  large  measure  because  there 
is  no  machinery  to  define,  in  the  complex  relations  which  states 
have  with  one  another,  the  precise  duties  which  each  owes  to 
the  other,  and  to  enforce  this  decision. 

IX.  THE  NATURE  OF  PATRIOTISM. 

We  have  now  reached  the  end  of  our  investigation  of  patriot- 
ism. The  state  is  essentially  the  embodiment  of  a  general 
will.  The  purpose  of  the  state  is  the  realization  of  this  general 
will.  The  state  is  a  harmonizing  agency.  Patriotism  is  the 
disposition  on  the  part  of  the  citizen  to  support  the  state  in 
this  its  essential  function.  In  any  particular  state,  patriotism 
is  justified  in  the  degree  in  which  this  function  is  performed,  in 
the  degree  in  which  the  state  is  actually  the  embodiment  of 
the  general  will.  It  may  be  remembered  that  in  treating 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  73 

Professor  Royce's  book  we  observed  the  fact  that  loyalties  are 
strengthened  by  strife.  And  yet  patriotism,  loyalty  to  the 
state,  finds  its  justification  in  its  conduciveness  to  harmony. 
There  is  nothing  contradictory  about  this.  The  prevalence  of 
disease  may  stimulate  the  manufacture  of  medicine,  but  the 
medicine  is  to  be  justified  by  its  curative  powers.  It  is  true 
that  patriotism  can  not  exist  without  some  opposition  to  call 
it  forth,  but  this  opposition  may  well  take  the  form  of  ignorance, 
indifference,  or  laziness.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  type  of 
patriotism  here  in  question  is  of  a  rather  unheroic  type.  As 
Hegel  points  out,  patriotism  is  not  merely  the  occasional  readi- 
ness for  great  sacrifices.  (Philosophy  of  Right,  If  268,  Note) 
It  is  rather  the  constant  and  quiet  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  citizen  to  further  the  common  good.  Loyalties  which 
thrive  upon  strife,  moreover,  are  usually  characterized  by  strong 
gregarious  feelings.  Our  patriotism  possesses  little  of  this  feel- 
ing. The  state  is  not  a  mob.  The  state  is  rational,  not  emo- 
tional, in  character.  True  patriotism  is  a  recognition  of  the 
community  of  interests,  and  a  rational  support  of  the  state  as 
the  agent  of  this  community. 

But  social  relations  are  international.  And  the  state  can  not 
adequately  fulfil  its  function  as  a  harmonizing  agency  until  it 
includes  within  itself  all  of  the  elements  which  may  conflict 
with  one  another.  The  perfect  state  must  be  a  world  state. 
The  community  of  interests  extends  beyond  national  frontiers. 
Each  nation  finds  its  true  welfare,  not  in  its  apparent  particular 
will,  but  in  the  general  will  of  mankind  at  large,  in  a  world  wide 
condition  of  harmony  and  co-operation.  It  is  notoriously  true 
that  a  state  interferes  most  seriously  with  the  true  interests  of 
its  citizens  when  at  opposition  with  other  states.  It  is  in  time 
of  war  that  the  citizen  is  taken  away  from  his  family  and  his 
occupation,  that  his  plans  are  shattered,  that  his  goods  are 
confiscated,  that  his  business  is  ruined,  that  he  and  his  family 
are  forced  to  suffer  from  lack  of  fuel  and  food,  that  he  is  mutilated 
or  killed.  A  nation  at  war  is  an  absurdity  in  the  social  logic. 
Its  very  rationale  of  existence  is  based  on  the  ideas  of  harmony, 
co-operation,  community  of  interests;  and  it  is  using  its  power 
for  the  purposes  of  discord;  it  is  destroying  the  interests  not 
only  of  the  enemy  but  of  its  own  citizens.  Not  that  we  must 
make  a  virtue  of  non-resistance.  Force  must  be  met  with 


74  Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State 

force,  but  the  entire  situation  remains  an  absurdity  neverthe- 
less. 

We  have  furthermore  noted  the  necessity  of  some  sort  of 
governmental  machinery  to  enforce  this  international  harmony. 
The  true  interests  of  states  conflict  no  more  than  the  true  in- 
terests of  individuals,  but  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect 
states  to  maintain  a  harmony  without  the  use  of  government 
than  to  expect  individual  citizens  to  get  along  without  govern- 
ment. 

The  solution  of  our  initial  difficulties  with  the  concept  of 
patriotism  may  now  be  indicated.  In  a  world  state,  the  un- 
justified bias  which  we  feel  in  favor  of  our  fellow  nationals  will 
tend  to  disappear.  New  Yorkers  and  Pennsylvanians  have  no 
such  bias  with  regard  to  their  respective  states.  A  feeling  of 
interest  and  sympathy  may  be  aroused  by  the  knowledge  that 
a  man  is  our  neighbor,  but  this  feeling  does  not  go  so  far  as  to 
corrupt  our  judgments.  Our  other  initial  difficulties  were  in- 
volved with  the  relation  of  patriotism  to  the  moral  law.  We 
were  not  only  to  support  our  country  right  or  wrong,  but  we 
were  actually  to  accept  our  country's  actions  as  a  sort  of  cri- 
terion of  morality.  In  a  world  state,  these  requirements  of 
popular  patriotism  will  tend  to  disappear.  Even  at  the  present 
day,  it  is  only  with  regard  to  external  activities  that  criticism 
of  the  state  is  tabooed.  With  regard  to  internal  activities,  a 
vigorous  criticism  of  the  state  is  rather  a  sign  of  good  citizen- 
ship than  of  bad.  And  in  a  world  state^_all  activities  will  be 
internal.  These  difficulties  involved  in  the  present  day  concep- 
tion of  patriotism  are  only  an  indication  of  the  imperfect  status 
of  present  day  society. 

The  result  which  has  been  reached  is  rather  of  a  paradoxical 
character.  Patriotism,  truly  understood,  has  been  found  to 
involve  internationalism.  Patriotism  is  to  be  justified  only 
upon  the  state's  function  as  a  harmonizing  agency.  And  the 
only  state  which  can  adequately  fulfil  this  function  is  a  world 
state.  Patriotism  and  internationalism  have  been  considered 
as  contradictories.  But  one  is  merely  the  ultimate  implication 
of  the  other.  Consequently,  our  internationalism  does  not 
mean  anti-nationalism.  Existing  states  have  been  invaluable 
to  the  cause  of  progress.  They  have  maintained  social  orders 
in  which  human  purposes  were  to  some  extent  harmonized,  and 


Theories  of  the  Obligation  of  Citizen  to  State  75 

in  which  man  might  strive  to  realize  the  best  life.  And  in  our 
efforts  to  bring  about  the  international  ideal,  we  should  be 
constructive,  not  destructive.  Internationalism  does  not  mean 
the  destruction  of  nationalism,  but  merely  the  transcendence  of 
nationalism. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


HAR 19 '64-12  M 


'D  LD 


FtB  2  4  '65-8 


SEC.  c:h.   NOV 1     1973 


AM 


LD  21A-40m-4/63 
(D6471slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


